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PREFACE 
This research has examined the impact of relatedness 
on one specific method to turn a declining firm around, 
merger and acquisition. The conjunctive model used to 
identify the turnaround candidates required that multiple 
qualitative and quantitative measures be met in order to 
include a firm in the sample. This has resulted in an 
extremely clean sample of turnaround candidates. 
The results of the research have demonstrated that 
relatedness strongly influences the success of the merger 
or acquisition of a turnaround candidate. The only other 
variable found to impact the success of a merger or acqui-
sition of such a declining firm was prior merger experi-
ence, and that association was weak. The combination of 
these variables indicates that the acquired firm should 
possess an appropriate base of knowledge for the merger or 
acquisition to succeed. 
A number of individuals were instrumental in helping 
me to complete my program and this dissertation. These 
individuals provided me with the understanding, intuition, 
support and encouragement which enabled the completion of 
this research. I would like to express my sincere appre-
ciation to them. 
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The committee directing the dissertation provided 
both crucial insight and assistance throughout this 
process. In particular, Benjamin Oviatt and Margaret 
White made themselves readily available with guidance and 
support. Their familiarity with and knowledge of the 
strategic management literature and research would have 
been difficult to duplicate elsewhere. Dr. Oviatt's 
participation was particularly appreciated as he main-
tained his active involvement on the committee even after 
leaving Oklahoma State University. 
Likewise, the contributions of the other committee 
members, Wayne Meinhart and John Mowen, were also crucial 
to the completion of this dissertation. Their critical 
insights and knowledge assisted in the development of a 
stronger research project. All of the committee members 
have established a standard of excellence which will guide 
my future actions when dealing with doctoral students. 
The other individuals who supported this effort were 
my family. Their help and encouragement were central to 
the completion of four years of study. I would like to 
thank my wife, Luanne, without whose aid and support this 
entire process would not have been possible. My parents, 
Dr. John and Ruth Bruton, through whose understanding 
about doctoral programs provided the support and strength 
to complete this endeavor. Also my sister, Sharron 
Bruton; my brother-in-law, Paul Pounds and my grandmother, 
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Rosa White spoke many words of encouragement and provided 
the motivation to continue through my four years of 
effort. 
Finally, I would like to thank Carol Kinzer for her 
expertise in proofreading and Glenn McLoughlin with the 
Library of Congress for his assistance in obtaining rare 
journal articles. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM 
STATEMENT 
Strategic management literature has begun only 
recently to investigate why some firms are able to revive 
their performance after a period of decline and others 
are not. Schendel, Patton, and Riggs (1975) were among 
the first to systematically investigate turnaround candi-
dates in the strategic management literature. The lack 
of academic investigation in this area is surprising 
since most businesses do face periods of declining per-
formance (Hofer, 1980) and must determine the best method 
of reviving their performance. This research will inves-
tigate one way of restoring satisfactory organizational 
f . . . 1 per ormance, acqu1s1t1ons. 
1 In this research the term "acquisition" will 
include merger. Although there are differences between 
acquisitions and mergers, they are inconsequential for 
this study, and the use of a single term simplifies the 
writing style and eliminates grammatically awkward 
constructions. 
1 
2 
Definition 
The term "turnaround" has been used most widely to 
describe the revival of a declining firm. However, the 
treatment of the term has not been consistent. "Turn-
around" has been used to describe: a set of difficult 
situations facing a firm (Crost, 1984); a firm that is in 
decline requiring a special set of activities or strate-
gies to revive its performance (Hofer, 1980; Pant, 1986); 
and a firm after it has revived its performance (Bibeault, 
1982; Schendel & Patton, 1976; Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 
1975, 1976). For the purpose of this research, a turn-
around firm is one that is in a decline and is a candidate 
for a special set of activities to revive its performance. 
Reversal of its decline is termed a "successful turnaround 
firm." 
Importance of Turnarounds 
Since most businesses experience a decline in 
performance some time during their history (Hofer, 1980), 
understanding turnaround candidates and how some firms 
can successfully revive performance is important. As 
would be expected, business practitioners have demon-
strated a significant interest in the concept of turn-
around and the process of creating successful turnarounds 
(Easton, 1976; Eisenberg, 1972; Goodman, 1982; Kibel, 
1982; Whitney, 1987). A related area of research that 
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also demonstrates this concern for firms in decline is the 
investigation of companies that have collapsed (Argenti, 
1976; Ross & Kami, 1983). These works examine the fall of 
firms and prescribe ways that such crisis situations could 
have been avoided. 
Despite the interest of practitioners, the number of 
academic studies of turnaround candidates has remained 
limited (Ramanujam, 1984). These limited investigations 
can be categorized broadly. First, a number of them have 
examined the characteristics of the successful turnaround 
candidates as compared to the unsuccessful candidates 
(Bibeault, 1982; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; 
O'Neill, 1982; Schendel & Patton, 1976; Schendel et al., 
1975, 1976). Second, the contextual characteristics of 
successful and unsuccessful turnarounds attempts have 
been compared (Pant, 1986; Ramanujam, 1984). The term 
contextual characteristics refers to the internal charac-
teristics of the firm, such as firm size, market share, 
capital intensity, and diversification level, and to 
external factors, such as industry growth rate, industry 
research and development spending levels, and concentra-
tion of ownership in the industry. 
Several issues arise from the prior research. There 
is evidence from the accounting literature that firms in 
severe decline may seek a merger with other firms to 
avoid bankruptcy (Altman, 1971; Stiglitz, 1972). Also, 
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the practitioner literature has prescribed acquisition by 
a stronger firm as one potential solution to the firm's 
problems (Kibel, 1982). To date, the empirical work on 
turnaround has not focused on the impact of acquisitions 
on the turnaround candidate. This absence from consider-
ation is particularly startling because it has become so 
prominent. The level of acquisitions continues to rise, 
with some calling the increased activity "merger fever" 
(Washington Post, 1988). 
Another issue that becomes clear from a review of 
the research on turnaround candidates is the lack of 
consistency in operational definitions. Quantitative and 
qualitative measures have been used to define operation-
ally a firm experiencing a decline and recovery. Addi-
tionally, multiple quantitative measures have been used: 
net income (Bibeault, 1982; Schendel & Patton, 1976; 
Schendel et al., 1975, 1976), return on investment 
(Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Ramanujam, 1984), and return 
on assets (Pant, 1986). Even those studies which used 
the same measures for definitional purposes have used 
them in different ways. 
Problem Statement 
As part of a broad exploration of unrelated diversi-
fication, Dundas and Richardson (1982) introduced the 
idea that "relatedness" might be a determining factor in 
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the successful acquisition of turnaround candidates. 
Relatedness is the degree of fit or possible synergy 
between the products, processes, and markets of business-
es within a single corporation. 
To date the evidence on whether related or unrelated 
divers~fication efforts result in better performance is 
inconclusive. Some studies (Bettis, 1981; Rurnelt 1974, 
1982) found related diversification resulted in better 
performance. Others have found only weak support for the 
effectiveness of related diversification (Palepu, 1985; 
Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987). However, some research-
ers argue that industry characteristics are either as 
important or more important than the type of merger in 
deciding performance results (Bettis & Hall, 1982; 
Christensen & Montgomery, 1981). 
Dundas and Richardson (1982) argued that unrelated 
acquisitions that require turnaround management should be 
avoided because such situations require skills and knowl-
edge that are highly industry specific and often unavail-
able among the financial specialists and management 
generalists that direct conglomerate corporations. In a 
turnaround situation, they argued, a related acquisition 
would result in better performance. 
This study will test the hypothesis of whether 
related or unrelated acquisitions produce the more 
successful turnarounds. The research will also attempt 
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to improve the identification of turnaround candidates 
methodologically. Previous research has relied on single 
measures of whether a firm is in decline or recovery. In 
this examination the measures of what constitutes a 
turnaround candidate will be combined in a method not 
previously used. The use of multiple measures will 
i.ncrease the validity of the study. 
The relevant literature will be reviewed in Chapter 
II. The research design for the study will then be dis-
cussed in Chapter III. The results of the study will be 
reported in Chapter IV, and the implications of those 
results will be discussed in Chapter v. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter will define the concept of central 
concern to the research, turnaround firms. It then will 
examine related concepts, the understanding of which are 
required for this research. Previous investigations of 
turnarounds by both practitioners and academics will be 
reviewed. Also, included in this chapter will be an 
examination of the measures used by the various investi-
gators and a discussion of their findings. 
Definitions 
The term "turnaround" has been used in several 
different contexts. First, the term has been used to 
describe a firm facing a serious set of difficulties that 
have the potential result of organizational death. This 
most general definition is summarized as follows: 
Definition 1 
When we talk about turnaround situations among 
dependent businesses, we are describing profit-
able, seasoned companies that get into diffi-
culties--difficulties serious enough to lead to 
bankruptcy if not corrected (Crest, 1984: 29). 
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A second approach in defining the term turnaround 
has been to identify a set of activities or strategies 
required to recover from a period of sustained decline. 
This approach has been described as: 
Definition 2 
... a different variation of a problem that most 
organizations face at some time in their exis-
tence: a major decline in performance. The 
response to such situations is almost always 
a major effort to "turn the company around" 
(Hofer, 1980: 20). 
The specific actions suggested have been of two broad 
types: efforts to increase operating efficiency, or 
8 
strategic efforts to improve the effectiveness of the firm 
(Robbins, Pearce & Robinson, 1987). 
Finally, other researchers have used the term to de-
scribe a firm once it has recovered from a period of 
decline. 
Definition 3 
By a corporate turnaround I mean a substantial 
and sustained positive change in the performance 
of a business. In most cases a turnaround fol-
lows years of declining profitability (Bibeault, 
1982: 81) . 
The above definitions indicate a lack of consistency 
in the use of the concept of turnarounds. This lack of 
consistency has been a principal weakness in the previous 
research (Robbins et al., 1987). Therefore, a clear 
definition of the concept needs to be specified. These 
various definitions of the term are at least consistent 
in that the authors view a turnaround as involving a 
sustained period of declining performance. Also, the 
majority of authors (unlike Crost, 1984) do not specify 
that this period of decline will eventually lead to 
bankruptcy if the situation is not corrected (Hambrick, 
1985; Schendel & Patton, 1976; Schendel et al., 1975, 
1976). The major disagreement among the various defini-
tions is in the breadth of the concept. The first 
definition is the broadest since it would include all 
firms that have declined, without regard to recovery 
efforts. The second definition only includes firms that 
have declined and are candidates for the special activi-
ties to reverse the decline. The last definition uses 
the term only if the special activities have been suc-
cessfully implemented, reversing the firm's decline. 
"Turnaround firms" will be used here in the sense 
that it applies to all firms that are candidates for 
using a special set of activities to correct a decline in 
performance. This definition is broader than Bibeault's 
(1982}, since it does not limit turnarounds to only those 
firms that have successfully implemented the needed 
activities. Therefore, the phrase "turnaround firm" will 
be used to specify candidates for special activities; 
"turned around firms," or "successful turnarounds," are 
those firms that instituted those activities and have 
reversed their decline. 
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Related Concepts 
The concept of turnarounds should be differentiated 
from several related concepts. The concepts of declining 
industries, firms in crisis (Hamermesh, 1977), and 
bankruptcy are closely related to and share some similar 
characteristics with the concept of turnaround firms. A 
clear differentiation between each of these concepts and 
that of turnaround candidates will help to increase the 
precision of the analysis in this research. It is also 
important to examine two concepts which have implications 
for the proposed research, diversification and synergy. 
Declining Industries 
The first of the related concepts is an industry in 
decline. Entire segments of the economy may experience a 
period of decline (Harrigan, 1980), as in the steel 
industry or more recently the insurance industry. A firm 
in a declining industry may experience a deterioration in 
its financial position because its potential market for 
goods is shrinking. Whetton (1980) termed this situation 
"decline-as-cutback." Companies in declining industries 
may or may not be turnaround firms. A firm in a deterio-
rating industry may experience declining financial 
performance while it is outperforming its competitors. 
Such a firm is not classified as a turnaround candidate 
since it is performing well given its environment. 
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Therefore, the decline of a turnaround firm should be 
evaluated in the context of the industry in which that 
firm operates (Pant, 1986). If this is not done, the 
researcher may be analyzing a problem with an entire 
industry rather than a problem with an individual compa-
ny. 
One difficulty in performing such industry specific 
analysis is that many corporations, including those that 
are turnaround candidates, are involved in more than one 
industry. One business segment· of the corporation may be 
doing well while another is doing very poorly. It is 
this inability to control precisely for industry factors 
that has led investigators virtually to ignore the 
potential impact of declining industries in research on 
turnaround candidates (Bibeault, 1982; Hofer, 1980; 
O'Neill, 1982; Schendel & Patton, 1976; Schendel et al., 
1975, 1976). Yet industry decline and turnaround candi-
dates are distinct concepts, and the research reported 
here will take greater pains to distinguish turnaround 
candidates from firms displaying average performance 
within a declining industry than have any of the past 
empirical work on turnaround. 
Firms in Crisis 
Another closely related concept is that of firms in 
crisis. An organizational crisis has three dimensions: 
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1) a threat to high priority values of the organization; 
2) a restricted amount of time for response, and 3) a 
situation that is unexpected or unanticipated by the 
organization (Hermann, 1963). The crisis itself may 
emerge because of something the firm has done wrong or 
from a threat in the environment (Starbuck, Greve & 
Hedberg, 1978). A firm in a crisis situation may or may 
not be a turnaround firm; the crisis itself does not 
indicate whether or not the firm is a turnaround candi-
date. The emphasis in the crisis situation is the need 
for an immediate response to a threat the firm faces. 
Turnaround candidates may or may not have the need for 
such an immediate response. 
There are two situations, however, where the turn-
around candidate could face a crisis situation. Turn-
around candidates experience a decline over a period of 
time. This decline may go undetected or unacknowledged. 
Over time, the cumulative effect of the decline may 
create a crisis in which the firm's survival is threat-
ened (Hamermesh, 1977). Urgency in the management's 
actions is required to prevent a rapidly deteriorating 
spiral of performance (Hambrick, 1985). 
Similarly, a threat from the environment such as a 
change in an industry's dominant technology may create a 
crisis forcing a firm to recognize that it is a turn-
around candidate. Without such a crisis situation 
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arising, a firm's steadily declining performance may be 
tolerated (Schendel & Patton, 1976). 
Therefore, a turnaround candidate may experience a 
crisis situation as the cumulative result of its decline 
or as some other event in the environment. However, 
without such external events or serious deterioration 
performance, the turnaround candidate may tolerate its 
depressed level of performance. 
Multiple methods should be used to ensure that the 
sample of firms studied is truly one of turnaround candi-
dates, not firms in crisis. A combination of qualitative 
and quantitative measures that examines the firms' 
performance over a period of time should be used to 
distinguish firms in crisis from turnaround candidates. 
These measures will allow the researcher to ensure that 
the firms' problems have been developing for a period of 
time rather than being a situation that has arisen 
recently. 
Bankruptcy 
A related concept that has implications for the 
proposed research is that of bankruptcy. The third 
definition of the concept of turnaround examined at the 
beginning of this chapter argued that turnarounds were 
firms that had successfully reversed their decline. The 
bankruptcy literature can be conceptualized as the 
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opposite of this definition, firms that have not been 
successful in their turnaround efforts. This literature 
examines those firms that have been unsuccessful, at 
least initially, in reversing their decline. Bankrupt 
firms still have options available to them in their 
effort to survive; however, those options are more 
limited than those for turnaround firms. 
One of the foci of the finance and accounting 
literature on bankruptcy has been the use of financial 
ratio models to predict its occurrence (Altman, 1968; 
Altman, Haldeman, & Narayan, 1977; Beaver, 1966). These 
models have been discounted for use in the investigation 
of turnaround candidates because of their lack of predic-
tive power (Schendel et al., 1975). 
Some authors argue that a firm with a high potential 
for bankruptcy can return itself to financial health 
(Altman & LaFleur, 1981). According to Altman (1971), 
the alternatives available to a potentially bankrupt firm 
include: 
1. Change the product line or management 
personnel; 
2. Sell unprofitable equipment, plants, 
or even entire divisions; 
3. Solicit a takeover by a healthy 
company; 
4. Reorganize under bankruptcy court protec-
tion; 
5. Liquidate. 
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A brief review of this list demonstrates a high degree of 
similarity to the responses that are available to turn-
around candidates. Alternative 3 is the point of this 
investigation, the acquisition of a declining firm. 
Alternatives 1 and 2 above are similar to strategic turn-
around options available to a declining firm (Hofer, 
1980). Alternative 4 has been used as a means of turn-
around; that is, reorganization under the protection of 
bankruptcy statutes allows a firm time and means to 
recover from an untenable situation. Thus, the bankrupt-
cy literature may be seen as a subdivision of the turn-
around literature. The former places greater emphasis on 
financial analysis to predict bankruptcy. The latter 
concerns itself with a broad range of options for firms 
in decline. 
Diversification and Synergy 
Finally, two related topic areas that are of concern 
to this research are those of diversification and syner-
gy. The term diversification is a broader concept than 
acquisitions. A firm may diversify by several means 
including acquisition, internal development of new 
product areas and joint ventures. The interest in the 
present study is on diversification through acquisition. 
It is argued that the relatedness, or the potential 
for the sharing of resources or knowledge, between the 
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purchased and purchasing firms in diversification has an 
important impact on the success of any acquisition 
(Bettis, 1981; Porter, 1985; Rurnelt, 1974, 1982; Salter & 
Weinhold, 1978). The greater the degree of relatedness, 
the greater the potential synergies between the two 
firms. 
The question of whether related acquisitions perform 
better than unrelated is not without controversy, howev-
er. The strategic management literature, beginning with 
Rurnelt (1974), had some authors who argued strongly for 
the benefits of related diversification (Porter, 1985; 
Rurnelt, 1982). However, only weak statistical support 
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for better performance by related diversifiers has been 
found by other authors (Palepu, 1985; Varadarajan & 
Ramanujam, 1987). Furthermore, Christensen and Montgomery 
(1981) and Bettis and Hall (1982) found that industry 
characteristics were more, or at least as, important as 
the type of diversification in influencing performance. 
The financial economics literature has indicated 
that unrelated diversified firms perform better than 
concentrically diversified firms (Michel & Shaked, 1984) 
or at least as well (Weston, Smith & Shrieves, 1972). One 
reason unrelated diversification may succeed is that the 
purchased firm's assets are undervalued by the market and 
only a minimum of effort is required to revitalize 
them (Allen, Oliver & Schwallie, 1981; Salter & Weinhold, 
1979). 
The pursuit of synergy, however, is one of the 
principal motivations for an acquisition (Ansoff, 1965). 
In terms of the current research this means that the 
turnaround firm's products, distribution channels, 
assets, and management can be combined with those of the 
purchasing firm to make both entities stronger than they 
were alone. However, the research concerning whether 
synergy actually occurs in related acquisitions has been 
mixed. Some researchers have found that there is no 
evidence of any synergy between related merging firms 
(Haugen & Langtieg, 1975). Others have found evidence of 
synergy but have not been able to specify whether it was 
of the type typically found only in related acquisitions 
(Choi & Philippatos, 1980). Therefore, evidence of 
operational synergies being produced by related acquisi-
tions is limited. 
In summary, the common wisdom is that related 
a.cquisitions result in better performance. However, the 
acquisition literature is unclear whether related or 
unrelated acquisitions result in superior or similar 
performance. The evidence concerning the benefits of 
synergy, is not very strong. This lack of definitive 
insight suggests that other issues need to be accounted 
for. Differentiation between successful firms and 
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turnaround candidates would seem to be important when 
examining the impact of relatedness on the success of 
acquisitions. 
Previous Investigations of 
Turnaround Candidates 
The previous investigations of turnaround candidates 
can be categorized by the background of the individual 
researcher or author: practitioner or academician. 
Practitioners have written prescriptive material based on 
their personal experience as consultants specializing in 
turnaround activities (Baterson, 1981; Kibel, 1982), on 
managing firms which have been turned around (Eisenberg, 
1972; Pearson, 1977), and on their actions as the banker 
for turnaround candidates (Crest, 1984). 
Academic investigations of turnaround candidates are 
based on more systematic empirical evidence gleaned from 
the subject matter. The researcher gathered information 
on turnaround candidates as an observer rather than a 
participant. 
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This difference in the background of the investiga-
tor has resulted in differences in the way turnaround 
candidates are identified and in the analysis of what 
produced successful turnarounds. Both of these issues are 
of interest here, and distinctions in the ways that turn-
around candidates are identified are considered first. 
Measures Used by Practitioners 
In identifying a turnaround candidate there are two 
central points of concern, the firm's decline and its 
potential recovery. Practitioners have avoided specific 
definitions of these concepts. They often believe that a 
firm's state of decline and state of recovery are 
self-evident (Kibel, 1982; Stewart, 1984; Whitney, 1987). 
The manager should be able to make that evaluation, and 
specific measures of their occurrence are not needed. 
Some practitioners have used a qualitative appraisal 
of a firm's financial characteristics. The factors 
considered in such evaluations included shrinking net 
worth, overdependence on bank financing, excessive 
accounts receivable, and overstated inventory (Crest, 
1984). But these evaluations are still global and 
impressionistic, not specific and quantitative. 
Measures Used by Academics 
The academic literature has used both qualitative 
and quantitative measures. Each of these types of 
measures will be reviewed in turn. 
Qualitative Measures 
Academic researchers have used several different 
types of definitions of decline and recovery (see Table 
I) including qualitative approaches similar to those used 
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by the practitioners {Hofer, 1980; O'Neill, 1982, 1986). 
Researchers employing such an approach observe the 
general pattern of many characteristics in the firm and 
develop impressions of its decline and recovery. 
TABLE I 
MEASURES OF DECLINE AND RECOVERY 
IN TURNAROUND FIRMS 
Article 
Qualitative Measures 
Hofer {1980) 
O'Neill {1982, 1986) 
Firsirotu {1985) 
Quantitative Measures 
Schendel, Patton and 
Riggs {1975, 1976) 
Measure 
Impression of firm's overall 
financial condition, market 
position, technological stance, 
production capabilities and 
strategic health 
Judgment of performance pattern 
of firm based on published 
stories about profits and market 
share 
17 in-depth interviews with 
managers and archival evidence 
Decline 
4 year de-
crease in 
net income 
normalized 
by GNP 
growth 
Recovery 
4 year in-
crease in 
net income 
normalized 
by GNP 
growth 
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Schendel and Patton 
(1976) 
O'Neill (1981) 
Bibeault (1982) 
Hambrick and Schecter 
(1983) 
Ramanujam (1984) 
Pant (1986) 
TABLE I (Continued) 
flexible measure of decline and 
recovery which evaluated the 
goodness of fit of firm's 
pattern of decline and recovery 
relative to expected pattern of 
performance by a turnaround firm 
3 years decline 
in net income 
normalized by 
banking industry 
average (sample 
limited to banks) 
3-years decline 
in net income 
2 years of 
pre-tax ROI 
below 10% 
4 years decreas-
ing after-tax 
ROI, at least 
one year of 
ROI had to be 
below 5% 
ROA was in bottom 
25% of industry 
for 2 years 
3 years 
growth in 
net income 
normalized 
by banking 
industry 
average 
not clearly 
defined, but 
appeared to 
be based on 
researcher's 
qualitative 
impression 
of firm 
firms whose 
ROI rose to 
20% or more 
in the fol-
lowing 2 
years 
during all 4 
years 
following 
decline, the 
after-tax 
ROI rose 
above 5% 
ROA rose to 
top 25% of 
industry for 
2 years; lag 
of 4 years 
between de-
cline and 
recovery 
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Hofer's (1980) and O'Neill's (1982, 1986) qualita-
tive measures are similar and provide useful examples. 
Aspects of a firm's financial condition such as cash 
flow, break even points, and net income are considered. 
Also, less well defined aspects such as market share, 
market position, competitive position, technological 
strengths, and production capabilities are combined to 
form qualitative impressions of the firms' decline and 
recovery. 
The potential sources of such qualitative informa-
tion are numerous. Articles in Fortune magazine were 
used by O'Neill (1982, 1986) to analyze the companies in 
his sample. Firsirotu (1984) examined cultural changes 
in the turnaround of the small parcel division of the 
state-owned-railroad, Canadian National Express. He used 
archival evidence and seventeen in-depth interviews with 
managers of the firm to evaluate the firm's culture and 
its changes. 
The qualitative measures allow greater insight into 
the firm and its nuances (Harrigan, 1983). This insight 
comes from the greater detail which provides greater 
understanding of the firm's complexities. The researcher 
can obtain multiple viewpoints on the firm in a qualita-
tive analysis. These multiple viewpoints help to in-
crease the validity of the analysis if they agree with 
one another. However, qualitative measures are hindered 
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by questions of replicability among researchers and of 
generalizability to other firms. 
Quantitative Measures 
Academic researchers have also relied on quantita-
tive measures to evaluate decline and recovery in turn-
around candidates. The declining firm is one whose 
financial condition is below what is expected and/or 
exhibits an unfavorable trend. Three different pieces of 
financial information have been used in the quantitative 
appraisals of decline. These are net income, return on 
investment (ROI), and return on assets (ROA). All of 
these measures focus on the firm's profitability, but 
that focus may be in absolute terms (net income) or as a 
relative measure where returns are compared to invested 
capital (ROI) or to total assets (ROA). However, 
trade-offs are involved in any measure chosen for use. 
These three specific measures will be considered below. 
Net Income. Schendel, Patton and Riggs (1975) were 
among the first to systematically study turnaround firms. 
They used net income to evaluate decline and recovery by 
firms. They did not specifically define net income; 
issues such as whether or not extraordinary items were 
included were not discussed. However, typically net 
income is defined as the net sales revenue of the firm 
minus its operating, financial, and tax expenses. 
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Schendel, Patton and Riggs (1975) normalized net income 
figures with gross national product (GNP) growth. Firms 
whose growth in net income was less than growth in GNP 
were defined as "in decline," and firms whose net income 
growth was greater than GNP growth were in an "upturn 
phase." This allowed the economic condition in which the 
firms operated to be partially controlled. 
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Declining firms were defined by Schendel, Patton and 
Riggs (1975) as those with four years of uninterrupted 
decline in net income normalized by GNP growth. Firms 
were defined as successful turnaround companies if they 
had four years of uninterrupted increase in normalized net 
income following that decline. A two year lag between the 
downturn and the recovery was allowed. 
Before selecting net income as the measure for their 
sample, Schendel, Patton and Riggs (1975) compared the 
nature of the samples generated by three financial 
measures, net income, earnings per share (EPS), and return 
on assets (ROA). Again, they did not define exactly the 
definitions they used for the measures of EPS and ROA. 
However, typically EPS is defined as a firm's net income 
divided by the number of shares of stock outstanding. 
Return on assets may be defined as operating income 
before taxes and extraordinary items divided by the 
firm's total assets (Pant, 1986). They believed that the 
pattern of net income provided a more accurate picture of 
a turnaround firm. 
They were critical of ROA, arguing that the sample 
it produced included firms that, by the author's qualita-
tive evaluation were not turnaround candidates (although 
they did not specify their qualitative criteria). The 
example they provided was Xerox. For them, it was 
difficult to argue that Xerox was a turnaround candidate 
during the 1950's and 1960's despite a slight drop in 
ROA. They were also critical of earnings per share as a 
measure of decline. The sample it generated was signifi-
cantly smaller than that provided by net income. Thus, 
net income was evaluated as the most appropriate measure 
providing the largest and most accurate sample. 
25 
Three other studies have used net income to identify 
turnaround candidates (Bibeault, 1982; O'Neill, 1981; 
Schendel & Patton, 1976). However, the time span of the 
net income decline used by these studies to identify a 
turnaround candidate was different from Schendel, Patton 
and Riggs (1975). Bibeault (1982) surveyed executives 
who, based on a qualitative analysis, he felt successfully 
turned a firm around after it had suffered three years 
decline in net income. O'Neill (1981) identified banking 
turnaround candidates as those with three years decline 
net income, successful turnarounds were banks which then 
experienced three years growth in net income. 
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Schendel and Patton (1976) used a flexible measure 
of decline and recovery. Their measure was based on the 
general pattern of a firm's net income performance over a 
long period, rather than a specific decline over a given 
number of years. They selected 130 firms from the 
1952-1971 Compustat tapes which appeared visually to have 
a pattern of decline and recovery in their normalized net 
income. They plotted each of the firms' income as a 
percent of the base year. Then, they ran two simple 
linear regressions of income on time, one on the downturn 
phase, and one on the upturn phase. 2 The R values were 
then used to determine the goodness-of-fit to the per-
ceived pattern of how a decline and recovery by a sue-
cessful turnaround firm should appear. Their resulting 
sample consisted of 36 pairs of turnaround and matching 
non-turnaround firms. 
The use of net income as a measure of decline and 
recovery is not without criticism. Using net income does 
not involve an absolute zero. The absence of an absolute 
zero, or some point that places various firms in compara-
ble terms, makes contrasts between firms difficult. For 
example, net income has no means to control for the fact 
that a firm may buy income growth by using stock for 
acquisitions (Schendel et al., 1975). Since net income 
makes no adjustment for the additional capital employed, 
the income of the firm may be increasing, but only due to 
the new acquisition. More generally, net income does not 
control for firm size. Large firms and small firms have 
no common grounds for comparisons. Therefore, as a 
measure of performance it does not make varied firms 
directly comparable. 
ROI. Since return on investment (ROI), is a ratio 
it allows easy comparisons among firms. ROI is typically 
defined as income before extraordinary items divided by 
invested capital (Ramanujam, 1984). Invested capital is 
usually defined as long term debt plus preferred stock 
plus common equity and minority interest in unconsolidat-
ed subsidiaries. This allows the relative effectiveness 
of a firm's invested capital to be compared to others no 
matter the size of the firms, although it may still be 
important to control for systematic size differences when 
using ROI. 
At least two studies have used ROI in their evalua-
tions of turnaround firms (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; 
Ramanujam, 1984), although they have defined decline and 
recovery differently. The nature of the database deter-
mined how ROI was used. The PIMS database used by 
Hambrick and Schecter (1983) is assembled in four-year 
segments of data. Since they wished to examine success-
ful turnarounds, this limited their investigation to 
firms which had a decline in ROI for only two years and 
then recovered the following two years. To help ensure 
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their sample did not contain firms experiencing temporary 
and innocuous downturns, they established severe criteria 
for a firm's pattern of ROI performance. They defined 
declining firms as those with a pre-tax ROI below ten 
percent for two consecutive years. A firm was deemed as 
successfully turned around if its ROI for the next two 
years was at least 20 percent. The use of the ten percent 
level of pre-tax ROI was chosen because it was well below 
the cost of capital to firms in the mid-to-late 1970's. 
The 20 percent level was chosen for successful turnarounds 
since it was a significant increase over the ten percent 
used in the decline period. 
Other databases contain financial information about 
a firm over longer periods of time. For example, the 
Compustat database contains up to 20 years of financial 
information about a firm. This allowed Ramanujam (1984) 
to examine firms that had experienced four years of 
decline in after-tax ROI, with at least one of those four 
years having an ROI below five percent. Successful 
turnaround firms were those whose subsequent performance 
rose above five percent for the following four years. 
The unsuccessful turnaround firms were those whose 
performance remained below five percent ROI. 
Return on investment as a measure of decline can be 
criticized, as any ratio measure potentially can 
(Schendel et al., 1975), as identifying firms that are 
not true turnaround candidates. For example, does a 
slight drop in ROI over several years make a firm a 
turnaround candidate? Arguably, a very large firm with 
slight declines may not be a turnaround candidate. This 
potential problem was recognized by Ramanujam (1984). He 
sought to ensure that only turnaround candidates were in 
his sample by limiting his sample to firms that had 
experienced at least one year of below-five-percent ROI 
in addition to his other criteria. The five percent ROI 
was below the cost of capital for firms at that time. 
This allowed Ramanujam (1984) to show that not only was 
ROI declining for his sample of firms, but that ROI was 
low relative to other firms. 
ROA. Return on assets, in a manner similar to ROI, 
does aid in the comparison of firm performance among 
dissimilar firms. 
Pant (1986) defined turnaround candidates as firms 
whose ROA's were in the bottom quartile of their industry 
for two consecutive years. Successful turnaround firms 
were those companies that then improved their performance 
to the top 25 percent of their industry for two years; a 
lag of four years was used between the decline and 
recovery period. 
In summary, there has been little consistency in the 
quantitative measures used to evaluate decline and recov-
ery in turnaround candidates. Even among the studies 
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that used similar measures, the way in which these 
measures were operationalized has varied. Each of the 
financial measures has both advantages and disadvantages 
to its use. The next section will discuss the trade-offs 
inherent in the use of these quantitative measures. 
Discussion of Quantitative Measures. A principal 
concern in turnaround research is having a sample of 
sufficient size (Hofer, 1980). The fact that a success-
ful turnaround does not happen every day limits the 
available sample. For example, Schendel and Patton 
(1976) started with a potential sample pool of 1800 firms 
and ended with a sample of 66 firms. An important 
problem is that different measures for decline and 
recovery produce different sample sizes, and thus, the 
choice of a measure is driven by the sample size it 
produces (Schendel et al., 1975). Yet, it is not clear 
which measure provides the largest sample. Schendel, 
Patton and Riggs (1975) selected net income as their 
measure of decline and recovery primarily because it 
provided an adequate sample size. However, Ramanujam 
(1984) found that using ROI provided a larger sample than 
did net income. 
A second concern in turnaround research is to 
include only firms in the sample which are actually 
turnaround candidates. There are two dimensions to this 
problem. The first is the time frame to be investigated. 
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A sufficient period of time must be included to ensure 
that a significant problem exists for the firm, not just 
a minor mistake (Schendel et al., 1975) or random noise 
(Ramanujam, 1984). 
Periods of decline ranging from two to four years 
have been used. However, a trade-off exists between 
allowing sufficient time to ensure a problem exists and 
the previous research concern, sample size. The longer 
the time frame, the more limited the sample will be. For 
example, Ramanujam (1984) found 1,143 firms that had 
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three years declining ROI, but only 701 of those firms 
had a four year decline. In recognition of this problem, 
Schendel and Patton (1976) did not specifically set a time 
frame on the desired pattern of performance. Therefore, 
while allowing sufficient time to ensure that only true 
turnaround candidates are allowed in the sample, the 
researcher must be aware of the effect of the time 
dimension on sample size. 
A second dimension to the problem of including only 
true turnaround firms in the sample is the measure to be 
used. As previously cited there are benefits and criti-
cisms of each measure. One way to overcome these diffi-
culties is the use of multiple measures. Multiple 
measures used in the research would increase the validity 
(Hambrick, 1980) and might simultaneously increase the 
sample size by permitting a shorter time period of 
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decline to be used. Limited efforts have been made in 
the past turnaround research to use multiple measures in 
identifying a sample. For example, Schendel, Patton and 
Riggs (1975) examined the overlap between net income 
measure and return on assets. They found only 31 of the 
65 firms (47 percent) identified using the ROA measure of 
decline over four years were also included in a sample 
that used the net income measure. Ramanujam (1984) found 
a greater overlap between the net income and the ROI mea-
sures of decline. Examining three years of ROI decline, 
he identified 1,143 firms; of those, 823 (72 percent) also 
experienced three years of declining net income. 
None of the researchers used multiple types of 
information in identifying their sample, as suggested by 
Harrigan (1983). Schendel and Patton (1976), O'Neill 
(1981) and Bibeault (1982) used such multiple data sources 
to analyze recovery by turnaround candidates, but did not 
do so to identify the firms which had experienced a 
decline. It is argued that multiple data sources, includ-
ing published secondary materials, should be used in 
conjunction with the statistical analysis to further 
increase the validity of the measure of decline. The 
quantitative measures will provide financial evidence that 
a firm is in decline. The published information will 
provide the opinion of experienced observers and 
will allow greater insight into the complexities of the 
firm. Qualitative information will also provide indica-
tions of whether the firm was performing worse than its 
industry competitors. The two types of data combined 
will provide a clearer understanding of the firm than 
either could provide alone. 
In summary, each of the quantitative measures has 
benefits and problems with its use. The validity of the 
sample can be increased through the use of multiple 
financial measures. Additionally, qualitative measures 
of decline should be sought to validate the financial 
measures. Such combined methods move closer to the ideal 
for strategic management research (Harrigan, 1983) and 
permit a fusion of academic and practitioner oriented 
study. 
Characteristics of a 
Turnaround Firm 
Having identified their samples, investigators focus 
on two questions. First, what are the responses that 
have produced the successful and the unsuccessful turn-
arounds? Included in the analysis of successful turn-
arounds has been a conceptualization of the stages 
involved in the process. Second, what are the internal 
and external contextual factors associated with success-
ful turnarounds? The findings on these two issues will 
now be examined. As will be seen, the findings are in 
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such conflict that they may be interpreted to support 
either Dundas and Richardson's (1982) hypothesis that 
related acquisitions of turnaround candidates result in 
better performance than unrelated acquisitions or the 
opposing hypothesis that relatedness is not a significant 
factor in turnaround efforts. 
Responses That Produce 
Successful Turnarounds 
Once successful and unsuccessful turnarounds have 
been identified, researchers have focused on the behav-
iors which produce successful turnarounds. The differen-
tiation between practitioner and academic researchers is 
again useful for this analysis. 
The practitioner literature has focused on current 
operating factors that managers can change to improve the 
performance of the firm. The authors have similar views 
on the actions which should be taken: cost cutting, 
divestiture of unprofitable businesses, tighter financial 
controls, elimination of nonproductive employees, re-
structuring to ensure accountability, and leadership 
changes. Only two authors, Kibel (1982) and Stewart 
(1984), briefly address the need for longer term issues 
such as strategic planning. 
The academic literature also has recognized that 
there are similar operating solutions that increase 
34 
efficiency in implementing a chosen strategy. However, 
this literature emphasizes strategic solutions that focus 
on changes to make a firm more competitive within its 
industry. 
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This dichotomy of corporate responses to decline, 
operating and strategic, was developed by Schendel, Patton 
and Riggs (1975). They found that declines caused by 
operating problems (e.g., production bottlenecks, excess 
capacity) were frequently solved by operating solutions 
(e.g., cost cutting, plant modernization). They found 
that strategic problems (e.g., intense competition, 
obsolete products) were principally solved by strategic 
solutions (e.g., redefining the business, new products). 
Hofer (1980) supported Schendel, Patton and Riggs' 
(1975) concept that the choice of an operating or strate-
gic turnaround efforts should depend on the cause of the 
firm's decline-- poor strategy or poor operations. In 
fact, he became more specific on the nature of operating 
turnarounds. He argued there were four different types of 
operating turnarounds: revenue generating, cost cutting, 
asset reducing and some combination of these three. 
Hambrick and Schecter (1983) supported this analysis 
of a successful turnaround dichotomy in their discussion 
of "gestalts." Their empirical work revealed that 
successful turnarounds used three gestalts, or series of 
moves: asset cost surgery, where excess capacity and 
costs are cut; selective product/market pruning, where 
firms refocus on their most profitable sectors; and 
piecemeal moves which combine the other two gestalts. 
These are similar to operations (cost cutting), strategy 
(product/market pruning), or some combination of the two 
(piecemeal moves). 
Analyzing the responses that produce successful 
turnarounds in an operating-strategic dichotomy has 
implications for this research. The operating responses 
stress increasing the efficiency of the candidates' 
current operations. The practitioners who have performed 
operating turnarounds emphasized that speed was essential 
to their successful completion (Kibel, 1982). The 
requirement for speed implies that potential managers of 
turnaround candidates needing operating turnarounds 
should be experts on the business and industry before 
they take on the task, as the following shows: 
The usual route that companies follow when a 
turnaround has not gotten them back on the 
right track is a sellout to a stronger company 
in the same industry. Usually companies in the 
same industry have the expertise and the market 
requirements to give the shareholders of the 
troubled company a higher price than other 
companies could offer (Bibeault, 1982: 133). 
Logically, this would preclude acquisition of a 
turnaround candidate by an unrelated firm. There would 
not be time enough for such a firm to analyze the indus-
try of the candidate and to mount an investigation of the 
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candidate's shortcomings. The implication is that success-
ful operating turnarounds that employ an acquisition of 
the declining firm should be of the related type. 
This is consistent with Dundas and Richardson's 
(1982) hypothesis that a related acquisition works best 
for turnaround candidates. They argued that unrelated 
acquirers do not possess the skills to turn a declining 
firm around successfully. 
However, in acquisitions of turnaround candidates 
that require strategic changes, relatedness may not 
matter. Lack of a close relationship among the acquiring 
corporations' businesses may even be an advantage. 
Strategic turnarounds often involve strengthening a 
firm's position in areas such as technology or finance 
(Hofer, 1980), and the sources of new technologies and 
new financial structures may come from transferable 
knowledge in unfamiliar industries. Thus, an unrelated 
acquirer may improve performance in turnaround candidates 
which have strategic problems. 
Therefore, the type of acquisition best suited to 
the turnaround candidate may be contingent on the type of 
turnaround effort that is needed. However, two findings 
in previous studies suggest that successful related 
acquisitions of turnaround candidates will be more 
frequent than successful unrelated ones, no matter what 
type of turnaround response is needed. First, combina-
tions of operating and strategic responses are most 
frequently found in successful turnaround firms (Hambrick 
& Schecter, 1983; Schendel et al., 1976). Thus, famil-
iarity with a business may always be needed in order to 
act with the necessary speed to make the operating part 
of the turnaround work. Second, it is not always possi-
ble to distinguish between the two types of efforts 
(Hofer, 1980), suggesting the disappointing implication 
that the operating-strategic dichotomy may be concep-
tually interesting but practically useless. Neverthe-
less, an empirical finding that relatedness does not 
matter in the acquisition of turnaround candidates, or 
that unrelated acquisitions performed better, might 
benefit from a post hoc analysis of the type of turn-
around effort used in the successful business combina-
tions. 
Stages of a Turnaround 
Table II compares Bibeault's (1982) and Hambrick's 
(1985) stages of corporate turnaround. Hambrick argued 
that evaluation and analysis should be carried out 
throughout the turnaround process and could not be rele-
gated to any specific stage; while Bibeault identified 
evaluation as a separate stage. However, there is a 
significant amount of agreement on the other stages. The 
organization must stop the immediate threats to its 
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survival. The cash outflows such as accounts payable and 
travel expenditures must be controlled immediately 
(Hambrick, 1985). More serious cost cutting measures 
such as closing a money losing portion of the corporation 
may also have to occur (Bibeault, 1982). Once the 
immediate threat to the organization has has been halted 
the next stage is to rebuild the organization. Finally, 
the firm is able to expand in the last stage of the 
turnaround. 
Hambrick (1985) 
1. crisis 
2. stabilization 
3 .. rebuilding 
TABLE II 
STAGES OF A TURNAROUND 
Bibeault (1982) 
1. management 
change 
2. evaluation 
3. emergency 
4. stabilization 
5. return to 
normal growth 
Focus 
The focus in both models 
is on eliminating the 
immediate threats to the 
organization's survival. 
The focus in both models 
is on the rebuilding of 
the organization. 
The focus in both models 
is on entrepreneurial 
activity inside the 
organization as the firm 
begins to grow once 
again. 
It is reasonable to expect that a declining firm 
seeks to be acquired only after its other turnaround 
efforts have failed (Bibeault, 1982). One reason may be 
that the management of a declining firm often is replaced 
in the turnaround effort (Hofer, 1980). Therefore, 
managers of turnaround candidates only reluctantly will 
seek an acquisition. Thus, a turnaround candidate which 
is acquired most likely is in a very serious state of 
decline; i.e., a firm trapped in the emergency or crisis 
stage of the turnaround. 
Firms that are in such serious decline should follow 
an operating turnaroun4 effort because an immediate 
effect on performance is needed (Hofer, 1980). Strategic 
turnaround efforts take too much time to implement and to 
be successful. Therefore, operating turnaround efforts 
offer the greatest likelihood of providing the response 
such a firm needs to survive. 
Since turnaround firms involved in acquisitions are 
most likely to be in a very serious state of decline, 
theoretically only an acquiring firm that implements an 
operating turnaround effort will be successful in restor-
ing the firm's health. Recalling that operating turn-
arounds work best in related acquisitions, additional 
support was found for Dundas and Richardson's (1982) 
hypothesis that a related acquisition of a turnaround 
candidate will result in better performance. 
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Contextual Factors 
The contextual characteristics associated with 
successful turnarounds are the second major area of 
investigation among researchers. The term "contextual 
characteristics'' refers here to structural characteris-
tics, both internal and external, that are difficult to 
alter but that are associated with successful turn-
arounds. External structural characteristics include 
such factors as the industry's environmental volatility, 
concentration, capital intensity, growth rate, and 
research and development spending levels. Internal 
structural characteristics include a firm's size, market 
share, capital intensity, diversification level, finan-
cial leverage, growth rate, and whether managers own a 
significant portion of the firm. 
Previous research has found that contextual factors 
have a limited impact on a firm's successful turnaround 
(Pant, 1986; Ramanujam, 1984). Pant and Ramanujam 
examined a number of contextual factors and have been the 
principal researchers examining the impact of contextual 
factors on turnarounds. Size was the only factor that 
both studies found to have a significant impact on 
successful turnarounds; large firms were more likely to 
be turned around than small firms. Additionally, 
Ramanujam (1984) found some support for successful 
turnarounds being associated with less severe periods of 
41 
decline. Favorable industry conditions, such as industry 
growth rate, also appeared to have aided in producing 
successful turnaround firms. However, this last finding 
is counter to Pant's (1986) conclusions. Schendel, 
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Patton and Riggs' (1976) work also investigated this issue 
and found no significant impact from industry growth. 
Rarnanujarn (1984) discussed at length industry 
volatility measured as the coefficient of variation in 
industry shipments. But he used only a portion of his 
total sample in analyzing its importance since he could 
not obtain the needed information on all firms. Using 
this partial sample, this variable was not found to be 
significant in explaining pre-decline performance and 
post-decline outcome. The remainder of the factors he 
examined (number of acquisitions during the decline 
phase, industry concentration, capital intensity, indus-
try research and development intensity, industry adver-
tising intensity, and external financial resource depen-
dency) also produced either inconclusive or insignificant 
results. 
Pant (1986) found successful turnaround firms had 
higher degrees of external control; such control corning 
from individuals who owned more than four percent of the 
firm's stock and were not in the management of the firm. 
However, unlike Rarnanujam (1984) she found successful 
turnarounds were in industries that had higher levels of 
R&D spending and had a lower degree of interaction 
between operating profit and the ratio of advertising to 
sales than did unsuccessful turnaround firms. Pant 
(1986) did not find the industry growth rate, market 
share, financial leverage, capital intensity, or industry 
concentration, to be significant factors in producing 
successful turnarounds. She also found that the degree 
of diversification was not significantly different 
between successful and unsuccessful turnaround firms. 
There are two implications for the proposed re-
search. First, the research will need to control for 
firm size in order to assess accurately the impact of the 
related versus unrelated acquisitions. This is the only 
contextual factor found by both Ramanujam (1984) and Pant 
(1986) to impact successful turnarounds. The effect of 
almost all other contextual factors was either sample 
specific or both researchers found them to be insignifi-
cant in producing a turnaround. Two factors, severity of 
decline and nature of control, were shown by one re-
searcher (but not investigated by the other researcher) 
to have at least some impact on successful turnarounds. 
Second, the type of acquisition, related or unrelated, 
may not impact the success of the turnaround effort 
(Pant, 1986). 
This finding on diversification is in contrast to 
the implications of the previous discussion concerning 
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the types of turnaround efforts (strategic or operating) 
and the stages of the turnaround process. One implica-
tion may be that turnaround managers depend less on their 
industry specific skills than on a set of generic skills 
required in a turnaround. For example, it may be more 
important to the turnaround manager that he/she have the 
ability to motivate subordinates, find and cut wasted 
resources, and promote a clear (but broad) vision of the 
firm's future than it is to have specific 
industry-related skills. 
Summary 
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Past empirical results and logical extensions of the 
thinking of various scholars suggest conflicting ideas on 
whether related or unrelated acquisitions of turnaround 
candidates should perform better. Pant's (1986) findings 
suggest that unrelated or related acquisitions of turn-
around candidates may result in equal performance. How-
ever, a different result is suggested by the logic that 
only firms in severe decline are involved in acquisitions, 
that severe decline requires an immediate operating turn-
around for survival, that related acquisitions are likely 
to produce superior operating turnarounds, and that 
operating turnarounds are the most frequently encountered 
type. The proposed research provides a direct test of 
these conflicting hypotheses. 
Motives for Acquisition of 
Turnaround Candidates 
The last area to be examined is why a stronger firm 
would want to purchase a turnaround candidate. Kibel 
(1982) noted that a troubled firm usually must meet 
certain needs of a purchasing firm including at least 
some of the following: 
a. Specialized management capability; 
b. Excellent brand name identification; 
c. A tax loss carry forward that can be 
utilized; 
d. An existing product line that fits well 
with that buyer's customer base; 
e. A distribution network that increases the 
buyer's customer base; 
f. Excellent profit potential if an increased 
cash flow were available; 
g. A special premium which is being offered to 
the buyer; 
h. Valuable patents or trademarks that have not 
been fully developed. 
These factors emphasize connections in products, custom-
ers, and distribution channels between the purchased and 
the purchasing firm. These interconnections make synergy 
possible. However, the previous discussion on synergy 
illustrated that the actual findings on the existence of 
synergy were discouraging. 
45 
There are two other rationales for such purchases of 
turnaround candidates. The first comes from the turn-
around literature. Heany (1985) argued that a firm in 
decline not only has operating and strategic options, but 
also has the exit option. He argued that other owners or 
managers might be able to turn around a given business 
when the current owners could not. Managers often 
examine only a narrow range of options for a firm in 
decline. Someone outside the industry may have fresh 
approaches to solving the firm's problems. Therefore, an 
acquiring firm may seek the acquisition of a turnaround 
candidate when it feels it has a fresh approach to the 
firm's problems. 
Finally, the industrial economics literature pro-
vides some rationale for acquisition of a turnaround 
candidate. Mueller (1969) argued that managers have a 
preference for growth maximization. The manager is more 
concerned with the perception of himself or herself as an 
important and powerful head of a large organization than 
he/she is with the return on investment. Therefore, a 
manager may seek related or unrelated acquisitions 
principally for the growth it provides in the firm's 
size, not for potential returns. It is reasonable to 
expect managers to seek such growth since firm perfor-
mance has been shown to influence executive compensation 
only weakly (Kerr & Bettis, 1987). Relatedness, and the 
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degree of success in the turnaround effort may be subor-
dinate concerns. 
The reasons cited for the acquisition of a turn-
around candidate provide rationales for either a related 
or an unrelated acquisition. The first rationale (syner-
gy) promotes related acquisitions. The next two (fresh 
insight and growth maximization) could be used to justify 
unrelated acquisitions. The proposed research will allow 
greater insight into which of these rationales is appro-
priate. 
Summary 
The merger and acquisition literature has not been 
able to answer definitely whether related or unrelated 
acquisitions result in better performance. Similarly, 
the review of the turnaround and related literature has 
presented evidence that supports two arguments. One 
argument is that related acquisitions of turnaround firms 
have resulted in better performance than unrelated 
acquisitions. The other argues that related or unrelated 
acquisitions could result in equivalent performance. 
test: 
This leads to a hypothesis that begs an empirical 
Hypothesis: Related acquisition of turnaround 
firms results in better performance than unre-
lated acquisition of turnaround firms. 
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The research design proposed in Chapter III will investi-
gate this hypothesis. Innovative multiple measures 
combining financial and qualitative sources will be used 
to identify the turnaround candidates. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study will investigate the effects of related-
ness on the results of acquisitions of turnaround candi-
dates. This chapter will specify the research design. 
The design will use multiple measures and data sources to 
ensure validity. For example, both quantitative and 
qualitative measures will be used to identify turnaround 
candidates. The quantitative measures will utilize two 
financial measures in the evaluation of the turnaround 
candidates. 
The chapter will first specify how the acquired 
firms will be identified and selected. Next, the quanti-
tative measures which will be used to identify turnaround 
candidates among the acquired firms will be discussed. 
Third, the qualitative measures utilized to support the 
quantitative evaluation of these firms as turnaround 
candidates will be examined. Fourth, the measure of 
relative industry performance shown by potential turn-
around candidates will be delineated. The methods used 
to identify whether acquisition of the turnaround candi-
dates were related or unrelated will be discussed next. 
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Sixth, the measure of acquisition performance will be 
examined. Next, the technique to be used to test the 
hypothesis, a multiple regression technique, will be dis-
cussed. 
Identification of Acquired 
Firms 
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The first step in the proposed research is to 
identify firms which have undergone an acquisition. The 
information to make this determination will come from the 
Standard and Poor's Compustat computer tapes--the research 
file. Firms that have been dropped from Compustat's data 
collection process over the past 20 years and the reason 
for their elimination are identified in the research file. 
Firms that have been dropped from Compustat files due 
to acquisition during 1979-1987 will be identified. The 
time frame of 1979-1987 will ensure no acquisition over 
nine years old or less than two years old will be 
examined. This will allow two factors to be considered in 
developing the sample. First, the time span is sufficient 
to allow a sample large enough to perform the required 
statistical tests. Second, the time span is current so 
that an investigation of the impact of the acquisition on 
the turnaround candidate can be evaluated reasonably using 
a panel of experts. 
Quantitative Identification of 
Turnaround Candidates 
Once the acquired firms are identified the second 
step in the research will be to identify the turnaround 
candidates within that group. Turnaround candidates are 
firms that require a special set of activities to reverse 
the firm's decline. Sample selection shall be based on a 
conjunctive model. This type of selection is very common 
in the psychology and consumer behavior literatures but 
yet to be applied in the strategic management literature. 
This technique examines various attributes of a person or 
a firm and includes that entity in a sample only if the 
item is above the cutoff level on all attributes (Grether 
& Wilde, 1984). Quantitative and qualitative criteria 
will be used to identify the turnaround candidates in 
this study. The quantitative measures will be applied to 
the acquired sample initially. The presentation of 
quantitative measures will occur in two parts. The 
source of information for the quantitative measures will 
be examined, and then, the two measures to be used in the 
quantitative evaluation, return on investment and net 
income, will be examined. 
Source of Information 
The quantitative measures use a downward trend in a 
firm's financial performance to signify a firm in de-
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cline. Since the quantitative measures rely exclusively 
on financial information, the Compustat tapes provide an 
appropriate source of data. 
The Compustat files of interest in this study are 
the over-the-counter and the industrial files. The 
over-the-counter Compustat file includes approximately 
800 companies whose stock is publicly traded over-the-
counter. There are three industrial files (primary, 
secondary and tertiary industrial files) all of which are 
of interest to the proposed research. These three 
industrial files combined contain approximately 2,400 
companies whose stock are publicly traded on the New York 
and American stock exchanges. An examination of the 1988 
research file reveals there are 817 firms which were 
dropped due to a merger or an acquisition from the indus-
trial files and the over-the~counter file during the 
years 1979-1987. Unfortunately, the 1988 Compustat 
computer tapes do not contain historical data on firms 
dropped from the data collection process. Therefore to 
obtain financial information on these 817 firms, data 
from the original Compustat tapes issued from 1979-1987 
will be obtained. 
Specifying the Measures Used 
As discussed in Chapter II, there have been three 
financial measures used to identify turnaround candi-
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dates. None of these measures has established its 
validity as the most appropriate measure to use to 
identify turnaround firms. However, if two of the 
measures agreed in their evaluation of a firm as a 
turnaround candidate convergent validity could be estab-
lished. Therefore, the two most widely used measures, 
return on investment (ROI) and net income, will be used. 
The fact that they have received the greatest use in past 
research led to their selection. 
The first measure, ROI, will be defined in a manner 
similar to Ramanujam's (1984) definition: 
ROI = [( I+ IE+ MI)/ IC] 
I = income before extraordinary items 
IE = interest expense 
MI = income from minority interest in 
consolidated subsidiaries 
IC = invested capital: long term debt + 
preferred stock + common equity + 
minority interest in consolidated 
subsidiaries 
The second measure to be used in this research is 
the measure of income. The most common measure used in 
past research has been net income normalized by GNP 
growth (Schendel & Patton, 1976; Schendel et al., 1975, 
1976). This means that the net income of some turnaround 
candidates in the sample used by Schendel and Patton 
(1975) and Schendel, Patton and Riggs (1975, 1976) could 
have been increasing; yet, because they grew at a rate 
less than GNP, they were deemed to be in decline. 
In this study income after taxes but before extraor-
dinary items will be used. Extraordinary items may 
temporarily hide the underlying poor financial perfor-
mance of a firm. For example, the sale of assets may 
allow a one time increase in income; however, such a sale 
may not resolve the firm's reasons for its poor perfor-
mance. Thus, extraordinary items will be excluded from 
consideration. These income figures will then be normal-
ized by GNP growth. Information on GNP growth was 
obtained from the 1988 Economic Report of the 
President. 
I OI - IE - IT - SI 
I Income before Extraordinary Items 
OI = Operating Income 
IE = Interest Expense 
IT = Income Taxes 
SI = Special Items 
I2 - I1 NI = - GNPG 
I1 
NI = Normalized Income 
I2 = Income before extraordinary items year 2 
I1 = Income before extraordinary items year 1 
GNPG = percent GNP growth from year 1 to year 2 
It would be logical to expect a very high correla-
tion between ROI and NI. However, Ramanujam (1984) found 
only a 72 percent overlap between firms with three years 
of declining ROI and three years of declining income. 
This lack of consistency further supports the need for 
multiple measures that are in agreement to identify 
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turnaround candidates. Therefore, both measures will be 
used in this investigation. 
As noted in Chapter II, the length of time examined 
is critical. The longer the time frame, the more certain 
it is that the firm is in decline. However, the longer 
the time frame the smaller the sample. Previous research 
has used defined periods for evaluations of decline 
ranging from two years {Hambrick & Schecter, 1983) to 
four years {Ramanujam, 1984; Schendel et al., 1975, 
1976). A four year time frame helps to increase the 
validity of the selection of a firm as a turnaround 
candidate. However, the use of multiple measures in-
creases the validity of the selection, making the longer 
time period an excessive constraint without substantially 
increasing the validity. Therefore, three years of 
decline in the two financial measures will be used to 
identify turnaround candidates. 
An additional requirement will be that there is a 
one year lag between the three years of decline and the 
acquisition date. Two issues motivate this requirement. 
First, financial information is not available for all 
firms the year prior to the acquisition. The financial 
data from Compustat is gathered based on fiscal year. 
The financial data for the latest fiscal year may not 
always be available on Compustat if the release of the 
Compustat tape occurs before the financial information 
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for the last fiscal year is obtained. Typically, this 
missing year of data is then reported on the next 
Compustat tape. However, once an acquisition is com-
pleted, the firm will no longer release financial infor-
mation and it is then dropped from data collection by 
Compustat. The result is that in a few cases no finan-
cial information for the year prior to the acquisition 
can be obtained. 
A second reason for allowing the one year lag 
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relates to those companies that do have financial infor-
mation the year prior to the acquisition. This concern 
relates particularly to those firms that may have an 
upward swing in their financial performance that year 
after a three year period of decline. The upswing in 
performance may reflect that even the announcement of a 
pending acquisition, while not completed, may have a 
positive impact on the firm's performance. For example, 
suppliers of turnaround candidates' inputs and financial 
resources may have tightened credit requirements as the 
firm's performance deteriorated. They fear that under 
normal credit terms if the firm should file for bankrupt-
cy they may not receive payment for the items supplied. 
However, the proposed acquisition by a stronger firm 
prompts the supplier to return to normal credit terms 
because the stronger partner is expected to pay the 
supplier after the acquisition. In summary, in evaluating 
quantitatively which firms are turnaround candidates, the 
last year before the acquisition may actually reveal more 
about the acquisition effort than it does about the turn-
around effort. The means that will be used to avoid this 
potentially confounding factor will be to maintain a one 
year lag between the decline period and the acquisition. 
Qualitative Measures 
The discussion in Chapter II highlighted the need 
for both quantitative and qualitative measures to identi-
fy turnaround candidates. The two types of measures 
taken together increase the validity of the designation 
of a firm as a turnaround candidate. The addition of the 
richer qualitative measures helps to ensure that when the 
financial data being analyzed indicated a decline, this 
indication was consistent with the way outsiders viewed 
the firm. Another benefit is that it provides both an 
academic and a practitioner view of the firm. 
O'Neill (1982, 1986} in his analysis of turnaround 
candidates used published articles from the business 
press that discussed the firms under consideration. He 
discussed such information as being appropriate for 
several reasons. First, the business writer is a trained 
professional who records the activities of the firm. 
Second, the nature of the audience is a professional one 
that demands accuracy in evaluations of firms. Finally, 
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such writers have greater access to channels of informa-
tion than do academicians. Published sources of informa-
tion appear to be particularly appropriate in this study. 
The analysis of such published material will be 
conducted in a manner similar to that of Montgomery, 
Thomas and Kamath (1984). The relevant articles on each 
of the firms will be obtained from the citations provided 
by the Predicasts F&S Index. The index will be examined 
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for three years prior to the acquisition, the year of the 
acquisition and for one year after the acquisition. These 
articles then will be reviewed for their content. Speci-
fically, discussions concerning performance problems, 
reasons for such problems, and the firm's relative indus-
try performance will be analyzed. Specific quotations and 
discussions concerning these factors for each firm will be 
extracted from the articles. Then these summaries will be 
presented to a panel of three academic experts for their 
consensus evaluation of whether the firms will be consider-
ed turnaround candidates. 
Analytical stories will not be available on all 
firms. Therefore, the qualitative analysis will be used 
to confirm the quantitative measures previously used. 
When conflicts between the quantitative and qualitative 
measures appear within the data on a firm, the firm will 
be eliminated from the sample. However, if no published 
information can be located to provide insight into the 
firm, the firm will not be eliminated from the sample. 
Industry Comparisons 
Once firms have quantitatively and qualitatively 
been identified as turnaround candidates it will also be 
necessary to ensure these firms' industries are not in 
decline. Firms that are part of industries in decline 
may not be turnaround candidates, especially those firms 
that are performing better than the industry as a whole. 
The analysis of industry performance will occur in 
two steps. First, qualitative evaluations of the firms 
will consider the relative performance of the firm. 
Specifically, the published material used to confirm a 
firm's decline will also be used by the panel of experts 
to evaluate that firm's performance relative to other 
comparable firms. This material will be a qualitative 
evaluation of the firm's overall competitive position, 
including such issues as relative profit, market share, 
growth and recent stock price. (See Appendices D and E.) 
It is still possible for a firm to be a turnaround 
candidate in a declining industry. However, for this to 
occur there must be a clear indication that the firm's 
performance is worse than that of·its major competitors. 
If the qualitative information indicates that a firm is 
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doing well relative to its competitors it will not be 
included in the sample. 
There will not be qualitative comparisons for all 
firms. A number of smaller firms in the study's sample 
may not have sufficient information written about them 
for an analysis of their competitive position. Addition-
ally, the convergent validity of the study will be 
increased if a quantitative measure can confirm the 
qualitative analysis of the performance of various 
industries. Therefore a second step will examine the 
financial trends of the principal industry in which a 
firm is involved. If it is in decline that firm will be 
evaluated quantitatively as in an industry in decline. 
However, such an examination may not be useful for 
all firms. Many of the firms in the sample are involved 
in more than one standard industry classification (SIC) 
code. It is difficult to isolate an industry's impact on 
widely diversified firms. Therefore, the firms that are 
active in only one or two SIC codes--most likely the 
smaller firms--will have a quantitative industry analysis 
performed. The principal four-digit SIC code for these 
firms in the sample will be obtained from Standard and 
Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives 
and other publicly available sources. Then the average 
return on investment for the principal industry of firms 
active in only one or two SIC codes will be examined. 
60 
61 
Industries in which the ratio trends downward during the 
same three years used to identify the turnaround candidate 
will be considered industries in decline. If the finan-
cial ratios are trending upward or have mixed results, the 
industry will not be considered in decline. Firms in 
declining industries, with no evidence that such firms are 
performing worse than the industry as a whole, will not be 
included in the sample. When there is evidence that a 
firm has relatively poor performance in a declining 
industry, the firm will be included in the sample. 
The source of this comparative information will be 
the Robert Morris Associates Annual Statement Studies 
(professional commercial lenders association). There are 
many potential sources of information for such compari-
sons. The Robert Morris Associates ratios were chosen 
due to the critical role a turnaround candidate's banker 
plays in its turnaround efforts (Pant, 1986). These 
ratios are used by lenders to evaluate the relative 
performance of a turnaround candidate. Additionally, 
most of the turnaround candidates to be investigated in 
this research are smaller in size than Fortune 500 
corporations. The firms used to arrive at Robert Morris 
Associates composite figures, similarly, are relatively 
small. Therefore, it is appropriate that such an infor-
mation source be used to evaluate the relative perfor-
mance of an entire industry over time. 
Relatedness of Acquisitions 
Once the turnaround candidates that have undergone 
acquisition have been identified, the next stage of the 
research will be to evaluate whether the acquisitions of 
such firms were related or unrelated. The date of the 
acquisition can be identified from either the journal 
Mergers & Acquisitions or from the business press. These 
sources can also be used to identify the acquiring firm. 
Only those firms which made purchases of the entire firm 
will be considered. Additionally, only those firms where 
the purchasing firm did not control the acquired firm 
through ownership of a significant block of stock prior 
to the full acquisition will be included in the sample. 
The controlling firm may have been responsible for the 
decline experienced by the turnaround candidate. This 
would make the determination of the impact of the related 
or unrelated acquisition difficult. 
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The initial evaluation of relatedness will be based 
on four-digit SIC codes. These codes will be obtained for 
one year prior to the acquisition from Standard and Poor's 
Register, Dun and Bradstreet's Million Dollar Directory, 
Dun and Bradstreet's Principal International Businesses, 
and Ward's Business Directory of Major u.s. Private 
Companies. Any overlap between any of the SIC codes of 
the acquired or acquiring firms will be evaluated initial-
ly as a related acquisition. 
A second measure of relatedness will also be used. 
It is a categorical measure and involves the judgment of 
researchers. Here, a panel of academic experts will 
categorize acquisitions as related or unrelated based on 
information such as the firm's revenue sources, its 
products, its markets and its production processes. This 
information will be drawn from published articles, and 
from telephone conversations with the firms and trade 
associations. Rumelt's (1974) guideline that 70 percent 
of firm's revenues must come from one distinct business 
area for the acquisition to be considered related will be 
used. If the consensus of the experts' classification 
does not agree with the initial evaluation using SIC 
codes, the experts' classifications will be used due to 
the greater information which they can incorporate into 
their analysis in addition to the SIC codes. 
Performance 
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The dependent variable in the proposed research will 
be the performance experienced by the acquiring firm from 
its acquisition of the turnaround candidate. Financial 
information will not be available on turnaround candidates 
once they are acquired since the acquired firm's resources 
may be dispersed among the assets of the acquiring firm. 
Therefore, a qualitative measure of the resulting perfor-
mance experienced by the acquiring firm as a result of the 
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acquisition will be used. This qualitative measure will 
be based on the evaluation of a panel of academic experts. 
The panel will consist of three academics experi-
enced in evaluating firm performance. They will be 
different from those that classified the acquisitions as 
related and unrelated, and they will be ignorant of those 
classifications. The experts will be asked to evaluate 
on a seven-point Likert scale the success of each acqui-
sition. (See the questionnaire in Appendix A.) Their 
evaluation will be based on published accounts of the 
results of the acquisitions collected and provided to 
each panel member from journals, and published stock 
broker analyses. The method is similar to O'Neill's 
(1982, 1986) method for determining organizational 
performance, except that multiple opinions and multiple 
data sources are used to ensure validity and reliability. 
The performance value used for each acquisition will be 
the mean of the three academics' ratings. 
Hypothesis Testing 
The primary statistical technique used to analyze 
the data will be a multiple linear regression. The 
principal focus of the investigation is the performance 
impact of relatedness on acquisition of a turnaround 
candidate. However, there are other factors that may 
confound this analysis. These factors include size of 
the acquiring and acquired firms, the severity of the 
turnaround candidate's decline, and the acquiring firm's 
experience in acquisitions. 
Ramanujam (1984) and Pant (1986) both indicate size 
to be an important factor in the success of a turnaround 
candidate. Their belief is consistent with the emphasis 
placed on size in the merger and acquisition literature; 
a critical mass, or minimum size ratio, must be present 
between the acquired and acquiring firm for the acquisi-
tion to be successful (Salter & Weinhold, 1978). On the 
other hand, an acquisition that is too large may be 
difficult to digest (Kusewitt, 1986). Therefore, it will 
be important to control for the ratio of acquired firm to 
acquiring-firm revenues. 
A second factor that may confound the analysis of 
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the impact of relatedness on the acquisition of turnaround 
candidates is the degree of decline the turnaround 
candidate is experiencing (Ramanujam, 1984). Ramanujam 
(1984) found that the more severe the decline in net 
income or ROI, the less likely was a successful turn-
around of a firm. Therefore, to control for this poten-
tially confounding variable, the percent decline in the 
income measure used in identifying the turnaround candi-
date will be included as a covariate. 
There is evidence from the acquisition literature 
that the experience of the acquiring firm performing such 
activities impacts the success of future acquisitions 
(Lubatkin, 1983). This experience may allow expertise to 
develop in the acquisition process. The acquisition 
experience of the acquiring firm four years prior to 
acquisition of the turnaround candidate will, therefore, 
be summarized by a count of the number of acquisitions 
during that period. This information will be obtained 
from the journal Mergers & Acquisitions. The covariate 
will be treated as a continuous variable. 
No other contextual variable concerning the acquired 
firm will be considered. The prior research found either 
no support or mixed results for the importance of any 
other variable. The only other potential variable that 
has been found to be significant and not contradicted by 
other research was extent of internal control (Pant, 
1986). However, this variable is not important where the 
sample of firms under investigation are all acquired 
turnaround candidates. The turnaround will be performed 
under the acquiring firm's direction no matter what the 
prior ownership configuration of the firm was. 
In summary, a multiple linear regression technique 
with an indicator independent variable and three continu-
ous covariates will be used. From the literature there 
is no indication that the proposed relationship would be 
nonlinear or that interactions among the variables should 
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be expected. The formula representing the variables to 
be used in this technique can be summarized as: 
Y. 
1 
= performance of the business combination as 
measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale 
= relatedness of acquisition, 1 = related, 0 = 
unrelated 
= ratio of acquired to acquiring firm revenues 
= percent decline in net income of turnaround 
candidate for three years prior to acquisition 
= number of acquisitions by acquiring firm 
during four years prior to acquisition of 
turnaround candidate 
i = acquisition 1 to N 
€. = random error term 
1 
Reliability and Validity 
This study has made a significant effort to estab-
lish reliability and validity in its measures. Reliabil-
ity is defined as the absence of measurement error 
(Venkatraman & Grant, 1986). The reliability of this 
study is aided by the use of a standardized financial 
database, Compustat, to identify turnaround candidates. 
This database is gathered through a systematic means over 
a number of years and the reliability of the data gath-
ered has not come into significant question. In summary, 
the reliability of the data and measures used should be 
significant. 
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Efforts have also been made in the design to in-
crease the validity of the study. There are several 
different types of validity which have been addressed in 
this design. Content validity is whether the measures 
used actually measure the domain they were intended to 
(Venkatraman & Grant, 1986). In this study content 
validity is assured through the use of a qualitative 
measure in addition to the quantitative measures to 
identify turnaround candidates. The qualitative measures 
are based on business writers' impressions of the firm's 
overall performance. These impressions help to ensure 
that the measures used to classify a firm as a turnaround 
candidate are doing so accurately. Similarly, the 
efforts to ensure that the potential turnaround candi-
dates are not part of a declining industry help to 
establish content validity. This effort to ensure the 
firm is not part of a declining industry eliminates a 
similar domain which may confound the analysis. 
The use of multiple measures also helps to establish 
convergent validity. The agreement between two quantita-
tive measures and a qualitative measure in their classi-
fication of the firm as a turnaround candidate helps to 
establish that the measures are accurately identifying a 
true turnaround candidate. Additionally, the financial 
measures used to identify the turnaround candidates have 
been built on the measures used in the prior research. 
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For example, Ramanujam's (1984) measure of ROI was 
duplicated in this study as one measure of a firm's 
decline. The convergent validity of the study is also 
aided by the use of two methods to identify the relat-
edness of the acquisition. Finally, the use of a panel 
of experts to confirm the qualitative evaluations made 
from the printed stories about the turnaround candidates 
helps to establish convergent validity. In summary, the 
proposed study helps to establish more clearly the 
content and convergent validity of the measures used than 
has been the case in previous studies of turnaround. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
This chapter will discuss the results obtained from 
the research outlined in Chapter III. These results will 
be discussed in two parts. First, the sample of turn-
around candidates derived from the multi-method selection 
process will be considered. Second, the findings from 
the testing of the hypothesis will be examined. 
Sample Identification 
The research performed used multiple methods to 
identify the sample of turnaround candidates so that the 
results of related versus unrelated acquisitions could be 
understood. Table III and Appendix B provide a summary 
of how the final sample was derived. 
Firms Identified Through Compustat 
Financial Information 
The first step in developing the sample of turn-
around candidates was the identification of acquired 
firms that had experienced a decline in their financial 
measures. The 1988 Compustat research files identified 
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817 firms from the over-the-counter and the industrial 
files that had experienced an acquisition during the 
period 1979-1987. To obtain financial information on 
these firms, copies of the original Compustat files were 
examined. The last four years of financial data for each 
firm was obtained from the latest year the firm appeared 
on the Compustat tapes. From this information, 139 firms 
that had three years of decline in ROI prior to the year 
of their acquisition, the year immediately before the 
acquisition not being considered, were identified. 
(Appendix c lists three situations where the date of 
acquisition was uncertain and one unusual purchase.) 
Ninety-three of the firms also experienced a three 
year decline in net income, 66 percent of the ROI sample. 
This percentage of overlap between ROI and net income is 
similar to Ramanujam's (1984) findings when he examined 
potential measures for his study; he found a 72 percent 
overlap between firms that had three years of decline in 
ROI and those that had a three year decline in net 
income. 
Two of the firms with declining ROI and net income 
were banking institutions. Examining the Compustat tapes 
over several years it was found that these institutions 
experienced substantial restatement of their financial 
reports each year. The two banks were eliminated from 
the sample since it was unclear from the restated 
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financials whether or not the firms were truly turnaround 
candidates. 
Required information on the acquisition, such as the 
identity of the acquiring firm, was not available in all 
cases. Nine firms missing this minimal information were 
dropped from the sample. 
Control of Acquired Firm 
The remaining sample of 82 firms was reviewed to 
ensure that the acquiring firms did not own enough shares 
of the acquired firm to constitute control prior to the 
acquisition. A firm that controlled a turnaround candi-
date prior to its acquisition could have been responsible 
for the decline of that firm. Seven firms were eliminat-
ed from the sample because the acquiring firm had signif-
icant control at least four years prior to the acquisi-
tion of the turnaround candidate. 
Two turnaround candidates were under significant 
control by their acquiring firms prior to their acquisi-
tion but were still included in the sample. William E. 
Wright was acquired by Newell in 1987; Newell acquired a 
significant share of stock two years prior. Graniteville 
was acquired by Southeastern Public Service in 1984; 
Southeastern acquired a majority of stock in 1983. 
Both firms were included in the sample for several 
reasons. First, little control seems to have been 
72 
asserted by either firm prior to the completed acquisi-
tion. Newell became involved in a number of lawsuits 
over the acquisition of William E. Wright. These law-
suits by stockholders appear to have frustrated a large 
measure of Newell's control until 1987 when they were 
able to acquire all of the firm. Graniteville appeared 
to be operating fairly independently until 1984, the year 
of the acquisition; in late 1983 Graniteville was still 
analyzed as a separate entity (Value Line, 1983b). The 
pending acquisition was discussed, but there was no 
implication of a shift in control. Also, a major trade 
publication, Textile World, did not discuss a shift in 
control until September 19, 1984, the time of the acqui-
sition. 
Another factor arguing in favor of including these 
firms in the sample was the time frame used in the 
sample. Three years of decline with a one year time lag 
before the acquisition was used in analyzing financial 
data to identify turnaround candidates. Neither 
Graniteville nor Newell's financial data would have been 
impacted by the purchase of their stock. William E. 
Wright's year end was June 30. Newell did not raise its 
stake significantly in Wright until September 1985. The 
Graniteville activity occurred the year before the 
acquisition. Again, this year of data was not used to 
identify turnaround candidates. Finally, published 
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material on both firms supports the contention that the 
firms were turnaround candidates prior to the purchase of 
the stock interest by the acquiring firms. 
These results illustrate the benefits of combining 
qualitative and quantitative analysis to identify the 
turnaround candidates. The rich information provided by 
the qualitative data ensures the sample only includes 
firms where the impact of the acquisition is clearly 
discernible. The elimination of the seven firms where 
qualitative information indicated that control had passed 
prior to the actual acquisition helps to establish a 
clear pattern for analysis: the firm's decline, its 
acquisition, and then the resulting performance. There-
fore, the addition of qualitative data helps to delineate 
more clearly the impact of related versus unrelated 
acquisitions. 
Nature of Acquisition Activity 
The presence of qualitative data about the acquired 
firms also allows the nature of the business combination 
to be examined. A firm experiencing a leveraged buyout 
(LBO), purchase by private investors, or a purchase by an 
employee stock option plan is classified by Compustat as 
dropped due to an acquisition. All such firms are not 
appropriate for inclusion in the sample of this study. 
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The acquisition by private investors does not allow 
the investigation of the impact of relatedness. The 
background of these individuals is typically not avail-
able for analysis. Also, individuals do not bring to the 
combination resources similar to that of a firm. There-
fore, no acquisitions by private investors were included 
in the sample. 
LBO's are technically a type of financing mechanism 
where high yield bonds are used to help finance the 
purchase of a firm; however, the term is also commonly 
used to describe a situation where a firm is purchased 
and taken into private hands, usually that of the manag-
ers. Again, this is inappropriate for inclusion in the 
sample. Therefore, the nature of the purchase and the 
parties involved were investigated where the acquisition 
involved an LBO. One case in particular, though, merits 
discussion. 
Riordan, Freeman and Spogli (RFS) purchased Bayless 
Markets in 1984. RFS later became known for LBO's of 
grocery stores where the existing management remained in 
control. However, Bayless was included in the sample 
because RFS bought 85 percent of the firm's stock and 
appeared to assert control over the firm. 
A final unusual type of acquisition was a purchase 
by an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). Under such 
plans the employees, through a third party, gain control 
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of the stock of the firm. However, again, since this 
does not affect the combination of two firms, such 
acquisitions do not allow the impact of relatedness to be 
investigated. 
A total of 14 firms were either purchased by private 
investors, taken private through LEO's involving the 
management of the firm, or purchased through an ESOP. 
These firms were eliminated from the sample leaving 61 
potential turnaround candidates for further considera-
tion. 
Industry Comparisons 
As discussed in Chapters II and III, the validity of 
the study will be increased by ensuring that the decline 
in performance of the firms was not due simply to a 
decline in the firm's industry. To do this, both quanti-
tative and qualitative comparisons were made again. 
Quantitative Evaluations 
As discussed in Chapter III, quantitative industry 
comparisons were not performed on all firms. Rather, 
only those firms active in two or fewer SIC codes were 
examined for a decline in industry performance. The 
industry performance measure was the percent of profit 
before taxes divided by tangible net worth during the 
years each firm's ROI and net income were in decline. 
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Quantitative industry data were obtained for 26 
firms. Nineteen firms were in industries that either 
were growing or experiencing no change at a time when the 
turnaround candidate was experiencing a decline. Seven 
firms were in declining industries. Specific industry 
comparison information was examined on these firms. (See 
Appendices D and E.) Much of this information was of a 
qualitative nature. 
Qualitative Evaluations 
A review by the panel of experts of the printed 
material concerning all 61 firms in the sample at this 
point was performed to qualitatively evaluate the firm's 
competitive position in its industry. Particular atten-
tion was paid to the seven firms whose industries quanti-
tatively appeared to be in decline. Qualitative data 
showed four of these seven firms were performing worse 
than the industry over all. As discussed previously, 
firms which performed worse than their industry, even if 
the industry was in decline, were considered a turnaround 
candidate. Such firms included in the sample were Howard 
Johnson, Graniteville, Lloyd's, and Weingarten. (See 
Appendix D.) 
There were three firms whose industries were 
quantifiably shown to be in decline which were eliminated 
from the sample. These firms showed no evidence that 
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their performance was any worse, and was sometimes even 
better, than their industry as a whole. 
Two other firms experiencing a decline in perfor-
mance were eliminated from the sample when it was deter-
mined that their industries were experiencing declining 
performance. Masonite Corporation's declining perfor-
mance was attributed to the housing slump of the early 
1980's (Business Week, 1984). Likewise, the decline in 
the oil industry contributed to Superior Oil's decline in 
performance (New York Times, 1983). (See Appendix E.) 
Historical Accounts of Turnaround Candidates 
As discussed in Chapter III, qualitative measures 
have been used to identify turnaround candidates. The 
use of multiple measures helps to increase the validity 
of the identification of firms as turnaround candidates. 
A total of 98 published stories were found on 43 of 
the 51 firms in the final sample. The consensus of the 
expert panel was that these stories were supportive of 
the analysis of the firms as turnaround candidates. 
These stories made specific comments concerning the firm 
prior to its acquisition which indicated its status as a 
turnaround candidate. These comments included statements 
about the firms' below average performance, level of 
financial losses, planned liquidation or bankruptcy 
filing, and the firms' poor competitive position relative 
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to comparable firms. The eight firms without stories 
written about them depend strictly on financial indica-
tors of decline for their identification as a turnaround 
candidate. 
Stories written about five firms indicated that they 
were not turnaround candidates prior to their acquisition 
despite declining ROI and net income. The names of these 
firms and a few illustrative comments can be found in 
Appendix F. 
Summary 
In summary, 51 firms were identified as turnaround 
candidates through this multiple criteria, conjunctive 
selection process. (The firms included in the sample 
along with the firms that acquired them are shown in 
Appendix G.) 
Table III summarizes the sample selection process 
used in this research. Mazen, Graf, Kellogg and Hemmasi 
(1987) argued that multiple selection methods help to 
overcome the adverse impact of the small sample size on 
statistical power by improving the ability to detect 
significant variance. The stringent methods used to 
select the sample in this research make the ability to 
detect variance much stronger. 
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Number of 
Acquisitions 
TABLE III 
SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION 
817 - acquired firms 1979 - 1987 
(678) - non-declining ROI 
46) non-declining income 
2) - banks 
9) - insufficient information 
7) - prior control of candidate by acquiring firm 
14) - private purchase, ESOP's, LBO's -
3) - quantitative indicators of industry in 
decline 
2) - qualitative indicators of industry in decline 
5) - historical accounts did not support that firm 
was a turnaround candidate 
51 - final sample of turnaround candidates 
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Hypothesis Testing 
The proposed hypothesis was tested using a multiple 
linear regression. The characteristics of the variables 
used in the regression and the results of the regression 
will be discussed in this section of the chapter. 
Variable Definitions 
The final sample of 51 firms was examined to deter-
mine whether related acquisitions resulted in better 
performance than unrelated acquisitions. The definitions 
for the variables used in the analysis were discussed in 
Chapter III. Several points concerning implementation of 
the measures will be discussed below. 
Relatedness 
The categorical measure of relatedness resulted in 
the sample being classified as 29 related acquisitions 
and 22 unrelated acquisitions. The categorical method 
and the use of qualitative data from multiple sources 
provided a rich measure for this study. Firms which were 
under transition could be classified accurately as to the 
relatedness of their acquisition. For example, Esquire 
Corporation received approximately 40 percent of its 
revenue from publishing in 1980. In 1981, Esquire 
acquired the publishing firm Allyn and Bacon. Thus, by 
Rurnelt's 70 percent revenue criterion this would be an 
~ 
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unrelated acquisition. However, by 1982 Esquire earned 
nearly 100 percent of its revenue from publishing. The 
method and rich data used here allowed this transition to 
be considered in evaluating the acquisition as related. 
The fact the methodology requires that 70 percent of 
a firm's revenues come from a discrete business area 
still makes the measure a conservative one. There were 
several acquisitions, such as Borden's acquisition of 
Guy's Foods or Hawley's acquisition of ADT, that involved 
firms with substantial experience in the industry of the 
acquired firm. However, with less than 70 percent of 
firm revenues coming from related discrete business 
areas, the acquisitions could not be classified as 
related. If these acquisitions had been evaluated as 
related, the statistical strength of the positive rela-
tionship between relatedness and the performance would 
have been higher (to be discussed later). 
Performance 
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The panel of experts evaluating performance were 
faculty members from three different universities in the 
disciplines of strategic management, strategic marketing, 
and finance. The panel was unfamiliar and uninvolved with 
the project in any other way. They used an average of 3.8 
stories per acquisition for their analysis of performance. 
The stories ranged in time from the announcement of the 
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acquisition to eight years after the combination. The 
median time was one year after the combination. The mean 
of all the performance evaluations was positive, 4.5. The 
correlation of the responses of the panel of experts is 
shown in Table IV. The average correlation between pairs 
of raters was used to demonstrate inter-rater reliability 
(Borman, 1978), and the average of 0.87 was deemed satis-
factory. 
rater 
2 
3 
TABLE IV 
CORRELATION AMONG EXPERTS' 
ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE 
RATINGS 
rater 
1 
0.81760 
0.89562 
rater 
2 
0.89604 
Greater information was available on some firms 
simply because the acquisitions were older. To ensure 
that this time difference did not impact the results a 
split half test was performed. The average performance 
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results' for acquisitions occurring 1979-1982 were compared 
to the results of acquisitions occurring during 1984-1987. 
The sixteen early acquisitions had a average performance 
of 4.16 on the seven-point Likert scale. The 32 later 
acquisitions had an average of 4.74. The averages of the 
two halves do not show the time differences to have a 
significant impact on results. 
Covariates 
The decline variable measured the decline of the 
firm's net income over the three years used to identify it 
as a turnaround candidate. The mean of the decline 
variable was 144.34 percent. Fifty of the 51 firms 
experienced a decline in income. The one firm that did 
not experience a decline in income grew at a lower rate 
than the Gross National Product. The range of the decline 
experienced was -2918.15 to a positive 16.91. 
The mean of the size variable (acquired firm's sales 
divided by acquiring firm's sales) was 0.88. The range of 
the size ratios was 0.01 to 11.82. The information used 
to calculate the size ratios came from sources such as 
Mergers & Acquisitions, the Wall Street Journal and other 
business publications. An effort was made to use the same 
source of information for both the acquired and acquiring 
firms' revenues. The information on sales varied from two 
years before to the year of the acquisition. 
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Finally, the mean number of acquisitions by the 
acquiring firms for the four years prior to the year of 
acquisition under investigation was 1.4. The range of 
acquisition experience was zero to eight during that time 
period. (The values for each firm for each value are 
summarized in Appendix H.) 
Multiple Linear Regression 
A general linear model was used to test the hypothe-
sis. The results from the regression are seen in Table V. 
TABLE V 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
Relatedness: 
Merger Experience: 
Percent Decline In Performance: 
Size Ratio of Firms: 
R-Square: 
F Value 
23.92 
3.96 
0.28 
1. 25 
PR>F 
0.0001 
0.0527 
0.997 
0.2698 
0.387983 
The model explains about 40 percent of the variance in 
performance. Only relatedness and acquisition experience 
were significant at the a = 0.05 level. The acquisition 
experience variable is only weakly significant, or 
arguably not significant at all. However, the use of the 
0.05 level of significance is an arbitrary criterion 
(Sauley & Bedeian, 1989). The exploratory nature of this 
research justifies the recognition of acquisition experi-
ence as a potentially important variable in explaining 
the success in the acquisition of turnaround candidates. 
The power of the analysis is an estimated .80. The 
hypothesis is strongly supported. 
There are eight assumptions that must be met to 
justify this use of a linear regression. These are: 
A. All variables must be measured at least at 
the interval level and without error. 
B. For each set of values for the k independent 
variables (X1 ., x 2 ., .•• ,xk.), E(e.)=O (i.e., 
the mean valU~ of ihe errot term fs 0). 
C. For each set of value~ for the k independent 
variables, VAR (e.)=o (i.e., the variance 
of the error termJis constant). 
D. For any two sets of values for the k indepen-
dent variables, COV(e., e )=0 (i.e., the 
error terms are uncortelaeed; thus there is 
no autocorrelation). 
E. For each X., COV(X. ,e)=O (i.e., each indepen-
dent variaele is eXogenously determined). 
F. There is no perfect collinearity--no indepen-
dent variable is perfectly linearly related 
to one or more of the other independent 
variables in the model. 
G. For each set of values for the k independent 
variables, ej is normally distributed. 
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H. The relationships under investigation are 
linear. 
(Berry & Feldman, 1985) 
To ensure these criteria were met several tests were per-
formed. 
First, the assumption is that all variables are 
measured without error (criterion A). However, visual 
observations of plots of the variables indicated two 
outlying values in the regression, the Riordan, Freeman 
and Spogli size variable and the Dairy Mart decline 
variable. Regressions were run without each firm and 
without both firms. Their absences made no significant 
difference in the regression results. Both firms are 
included in the sample for the results described here. 
Second, plots of residuals were run on predicted 
values. These plots indicated a pattern consistent with 
constant error variance (criterion C) and no 
autocorrelation (criterion D). 
The distributions of the samples were also investi-
gated (criterion G). The sample was found not to be 
normally distributed using the Kolomogorov D statistic. 
This violation of the regression assumptions is not 
without concern. However, the regression technique is 
robust to the violations of normality (Bohrnstedt & 
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Carter, 1971). Also, with a small sample of 51 it is 
difficult to obtain a normal appearing sample with the 
conservative Kolomogorov D. Therefore, the lack of a 
normal appearing sample in this situation is not criti-
cal. 
Fourth, multi-collinearity among the variables was 
examined (criterion F). The Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients can be reviewed in Table VI. The highest absolute 
value was .24 which was judged to indicate an absence of 
significant multi-collinearity. 
Decline 
Size 
Experience 
TABLE VI 
CORRELATION OF VARIABLES 
Performance 
-0.13045 
-0.19436 
0.15299 
Decline 
0.02582 
0.11727 
Size 
-0.23582 
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Finally, the plots of the dependent variable on the 
independent variables used in the regression were also 
investigated. No pattern was seen in the plots which 
would suggest that a nonlinear form of analysis would be 
useful (criterion H). Interactions were also explored 
without significant results. 
Summary 
Dundas and Richardson's hypothesis is strongly 
supported. The multiple methods used to identify the 
research sample increased the significance of the regres-
sion relationships. The result demonstrates that a large 
element of the explanation for the success of an acquisi-
tion of a turnaround candidate comes from the relatedness 
of the corporations' businesses. The implications of 
these findings for researchers and managers and for 
future research needs will be examined in Chapter v. 
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CHAPTER V 
OVERVIEW, RECOMMENDATIONS, 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
The research presented here has examined the impact 
of business relatedness on the acquisition of turnaround 
candidates. The results of this research have implica-
tions for both academic researchers and business practi-
tioners. These results, their implications, and the 
potential for future research will be discussed in this 
chapter. 
Overview of Study 
Declines in performance are experienced by most firms 
at some time in their history (Hofer, 1980). This study 
has examined one method of reversing a firm's 
decline--acquisition. This analysis has focused on 
whether related acquisitions result in better performance 
than unrelated acquisitions. 
Specifically, this research has filled three voids in 
the current literature. First, it has allowed a greater 
understanding of how to revive a firm's performance when 
it experiences a decline. Prior research has 
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neglected to investigate any specific turnaround methods 
in the detail performed here. 
Second, the research has allowed a greater under-
standing of the impact of relatedness on acquisitions. 
Previously, the impact of relatedness on acquisitions has 
been primarily a matter of speculation. This study helps 
to expand the understanding of relatedness by closely 
examining one situation, the acquisition of a turnaround 
candidate. 
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Finally, the research has combined methodologies from 
prior research in a manner never used before. Prior 
research has relied on one or two measures of decline to 
identify turnaround candidates. This study has used 
multiple qualitative and multiple quantitative measures of 
decline to identify the sample. The sample selection was 
based on the conjunctive model of selection. The result 
was a conservatively identified sample of clearly defined 
turnaround firms. By using such a sample, the validity of 
this research was increased. 
The principal finding of this research was that 
relatedness had a significant impact on the success of the 
acquisition of a turnaround candidate. This finding was 
consistent with the rationale discussed in Chapter II. 
This rationale argued that the speed of implementation 
required for a successful turnaround would require the 
acquiring firm to possess industry knowledge prior to 
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its acquisition of the turnaround candidate. Thus, 
related acquisitions should result in better performance 
than unrelated acquisitions. The research also showed 
that the experience of the acquiring firm in implementing 
acquisitions was an important factor in the success of the 
acquisition of a turnaround candidate. Two other vari-
ables, firm size and severity of decline, were found not 
to be significant factors in explaining a successful 
turnaround. 
These findings are consistent with much of the 
existing literature. As discussed previously, while there 
are a variety of findings on the impact of relatedness on 
acquisitions, the common wisdom developed from the litera-
ture is that relatedness is a significant factor in the 
resulting success of business combinations (Bettis, 1981; 
Rumelt, 1974, 1982). Acquisition experience also was 
argued to be a significant factor in the eventual success 
of an acquisition (Lubatkin, 1983). 
The two contextual variables, size and severity of 
decline, were not found to be significant. This is incon-
sistent with what Ramanujam (1984) and Pant (1986) found 
concerning size and with what Ramanujam (1984) found 
concerning degree of deline. However, Ramanujam's finding 
on the importance of decline countered the findings of 
Schendel and Patton (1976), and Pant (1986). No other 
turnaround research has examined the importance of firm 
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size in turnaround. The implications of these findings to 
practitioners and academics will be reviewed next. 
Implications for Academic Researchers 
This research holds several implications for academic 
researchers. As reviewed earlier, the prior research has 
been inconclusive in the determination of whether related 
acquisitions resulted in better performance than unrelated 
acquisitions. However, a higher degree of significance 
for the relatedness variable was found in this research 
than in much of the prior research. These findings 
indicate a new approach to analyzing the impact of relat-
edness. Dundas and Richardson (1982) argued that an 
unrelated acquisition could be just as successful if 
certain situations were avoided. Therefore, rather than 
seeking a global answer on the impact of relatedness, 
researchers should pay greater attention to potential 
situations where related or unrelated acquisitions are 
most appropriate. 
The second implication for researchers is that 
greater efforts need to be made in combining practitioner 
oriented qualitative analysis and quantitative academi-
cally oriented methodologies. The pool of quantitatively 
identified acquired turnaround candidates was decreased by 
nearly one-half when the qualitative information on these 
firms was considered. The nature of the relation-
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ship between the acquired and acquiring firms, the compet-
itive position of the acquired firm relative to comparable 
firms, and the specific firm analysis helped to ensure 
that only true turnaround candidates were included in the 
sample. No prior research had combined such multiple 
measures to identify turnaround candidates. Future 
research should make efforts to combine both fine and 
coarse grained methodologies (Harrigan, 1983) of practi-
tioners and academics to gain a richer and more insightful 
perspective on turnaround firms. 
The identification of two nonsignificant contextual 
variables, size and performance, has implications for 
academic researchers also. Prior research examining the 
relationship between successful turnarounds and contextual 
variables found either limited or conflicting results on 
the importance of such variables. This research found 
that the two contextual variables examined were 
nonsignificant. This indicated that academic researchers 
should redirect their investigative efforts from the 
relationship between contextual variables and turnaround 
to the examination of other factors; other potential areas 
of examination include how the turnaround is implemented 
and the specific strategies used in successful turn-
arounds. 
A limitation of the research should be recognized by 
academic researchers. A number of firms (9) were dropped 
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from the sample due to a lack of information on the 
acquiring firm. While not all, many of these acquiring 
firms were either privately or closely held entities. 
Although there were some private firms in the final sample 
of the acquiring firms the preponderance of the firms were 
publicly traded. This lack of privately held firms in the 
sample leaves unanswered the question whether the results 
found apply equally well to public and private companies. 
One other potential limitation of this study is the 
lack of control of industry differences. The firms in 
this study came from a wide variety of industries rather 
than one single industry. It was expected that any 
potential industry differences would average out and would 
not be a significant factor in this research. If a 
sufficient sample could be derived from a single industry 
in the future, an examination of the acquisition of 
turnaround candidates in this single industry would be 
interesting. 
Implications for Practitioners 
These findings have several implications for practic-
ing managers. However, these implications should be 
confirmed through other studies prior to their implemen-
tation by managers. First, before acquiring a turnaround 
candidate and attempting to revive that firm's perfor-
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mance, practitioners need to ensure that they possess an 
understanding of the industry. Practitioners may be 
tempted to argue that, while they do not have the specific 
industry knowledge, they do possess generalizable turn-
around skills, turnaround skills that can be applied with 
equal success to a variety of industries. However, 
quantitative as well as qualitative analysis of the firms 
in this sample does not appear to support this argument. 
For example, Sherwin-Williams purchased Gray 
Drug/Drug Fair in 1981. The expectation was that the 
skills of the individuals who had successfully turned 
around Sherwin-Williams would be transferable to turn 
around Drug Fair. However, the retail drug industry is 
substantially different from the paint manufacturing and 
retailing industry. These differences include: channels 
of supply (Sherwin-Williams produced many of the products 
they sold, while drug stores rely on numerous suppliers), 
inventory control and shrinkages, marketing, and nature of 
competition. The lack of specific industry knowledge was 
never overcome and helped to contribute to a lackluster 
acquisition for Sherwin-Williams (Kidder Peabody Company 
Comment, 1986). Therefore, practitioners must ensure that 
they understand the industry and possess the skills to 
compete in that industry before attempting to acquire a 
turnaround candidate. 
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A second implication is that practitioners need to 
review their acquisition experience. It has been argued 
that prior merger experience helps a current acquisition 
by building on previously acquired expertise. This 
expertise helps the proposed acquisition to be implemented 
more quickly and smoothly by allowing many of the poten-
tial pitfalls to be avoided. The successful turnaround of 
a declining firm is difficult enough without the necessity 
of simultaneously learning the intricacies of successful 
acquisition. Learning how to implement an acquisition may 
delay the actions required to quickly reverse the turn-
around firm's performance. 
In summary, practitioners should focus their analysis 
on their ability to understand a turnaround candidate and 
its industry. Also, the acquiring firm's ability to 
implement the combination once the acquisition has oc-
curred should be assessed. Other factors such as firm 
size and the seriousness of the acquired firm's decline 
are relatively unimportant in the success of the acquisi-
tion. 
Future Research 
The research conducted here has implications for 
future investigations. There are a variety of studies 
that need to be performed to extend the understanding of 
successful turnaround in firms. The needed future 
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research includes: a re-examination of the nonsignificant 
contextual variables using different measures; an examina-
tion of how differences in turnaround implementation 
impact performance; alternative strategies for reviving 
turnaround firms, and several topics raised by the nature 
of the research findings. 
First, further efforts are needed to examine the 
variables found in this research to be nonsignificant. 
These two variables had been shown by the prior research 
to be potentially the most important contextual concerns 
in the acquisition of a turnaround candidate. To ensure 
they are not significant factors, other potential measures 
of these variables should be constructed. These investi-
gations will also provide an opportunity to question 
whether such contextual variables are important only under 
certain conditions. 
Size in this research was measured by its most common 
measure, total revenues of a firm. There are other 
potential measures of size. One measure of size that 
could be appropriate in examining turnaround firms would 
be the number of a firm's employees, the size of the firm 
being the average number of employees over time. This 
measure of size, while normally highly correlated with 
revenues, could provide additional insight since it might 
reflect decline more accurately for labor intensive 
turnaround firms. 
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The second nonsignificant variable was the degree of 
decline in the turnaround candidate. Decline was measured 
similarly to Ramanujam (1984) as the decline experienced 
in a firm's net income. Another potential measure of the 
seriousness of the decline has been suggested by the 
bankruptcy literature. A number of financial ratio models 
have been developed to predict the occurrence of bankrupt-
cy (Altman, 1968; Altman et al., 1977; Beaver, 1966). 
Schendel, Patton and Riggs (1975) argued that such models 
lacked predictive power. However, further investigations 
of these models and their ability to identify turnaround 
candidates may be appropriate. The investigations using 
these bankruptcy ratios could provide an alternative 
measure of decline. 
Another area of investigation for researchers is the 
nature of the implementation effort. Experience with past 
acquisitions was found to impact the success of the turn-
around. Other implementation issues that may impact the 
success of the turnaround include top management's leader-
ship, the declining firm's culture, its structure and 
technology. 
Firm leadership is the first implementation issue 
that should be examined more closely. Specifically, 
future research needs to investigate the impact of top 
management teams on the turnaround of firms. Several 
authors have argued that top management should be changed 
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to aid in the turnaround of a firm (Bibeault, 1982; Hofer, 
1980; O'Neill, 1986). Future research needs to be per-
formed on the demographic changes among top managers that 
occur once turnaround candidates are acquired. The 
research can then begin to examine more specifically the 
impact of various leadership styles on turnarounds. 
Second, the culture of the turnaround candidate needs 
to be examined. Culture has been defined in many ways 
(Smircich, 1983). However, one way it can be defined is 
as a shared schema that helps organizations to interpret 
information (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). Therefore, the 
culture of a firm will impact the information processing 
that occurs as the turnaround effort is implemented. 
Information processing affects how the problems of the 
firm and the needed solutions are identified and inter-
preted. Different cultures may result in different levels 
of success in the the turnaround effort. 
Third is the impact of the corporate structure on 
turnaround efforts. Organizational structure affects an 
organization in many different ways (Galbraith & 
Kazanjian, 1986). One way structure could affect a 
turnaround is in potential organizational consolidations 
that may be required to make the firm more efficient. 
Consolidation may work differently in various types of 
organizations. 
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Finally, the technology of the organization and its 
impact on the implementation efforts of the turnaround 
firm need to be examined. Since Woodward (1958), technol-
ogy has been recognized as an important variable in 
determining the characteristics of an organization. 
Future research needs to examine whether certain types of 
technology used by turnaround candidates lend themselves 
to successful turnaround more easily than other types. 
For example, does a firm performing principally what 
Perrow would call craft technology (low analyzability 
required and low variety) turn around easier than a firm 
with an engineering technology (high degree of analyz-
ability required of workers who face a high degree of 
variety)? 
In summary, the implementation related concerns of 
top management teams, culture, structure and technology 
should be examined to gain a better understanding of their 
impact on the success of the turnaround efforts. 
Another primary area for future research is the 
alternative methods of successfully turning around a firm. 
For example, it has been argued that firms in decline can 
acquire other firms to help minimize their own problems 
(Risher, 1972). The acquisition of other firms may 
provide new products and markets to a firm experiencing a 
decline in performance. The potential for avoiding 
bankruptcy through acquisitions has already been 
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recognized by the bankruptcy literature (Pastena & Ruland, 
1986). The use of such an acquisition in turnaround 
efforts also needs to be investigated. 
Leveraged buyout financing is a second means that can 
be used to turn a firm around. A number of firms have 
been eliminated from this research since they involved 
leveraged buyouts (LBO's). While LBO's were not appropri-
ate for the investigation of the impact of relatedness, 
the impact of LBO's on turnaround candidates needs to be 
investigated. Acquisitions by declining firms and LBO's 
are two alternative turnaround methods that should receive 
a detailed investigation. 
Several areas of future research are suggested by the 
sample and the findings of this research. First among 
these is the investigation of the acquisition of turn-
around candidates by foreign firms. One reason cited by 
foreign firms such as Foseco Minsep for their acquisition 
of American turnaround candidates is to gain access to the 
American markets (Wall Street Journal, 1984a). While the 
number of foreign acquisitions in this sample is too small 
to analyze, there is some evidence that foreign acquisi-
tions have not been successful. For example, the acquisi-
tions by Foseco Minsep and Cavenham of American firms 
resulted in failure. Further research needs to be con-
ducted to examine the impact of foreign 
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acquisitions not only on turnaround candidates but also on 
firms whose performance is healthy. 
A final area of needed investigation is the impact on 
success of the elapsed time between the acquisition and 
the actions taken to correct the performance problems. A 
common feature of the two variables found to be signifi-
cant in this research (relatedness and prior experience in 
making an acquisition) is that they both allow the acquir-
ing firm to act quickly on the turnaround candidate's 
problems. Unrelated firms and firms not familiar with 
implementing an acquisition lose time as they become 
familiar with the industry or with how to implement needed 
actions within the acquisition process. Practitioners 
have recognized that the speed with which a turnaround 
effort can be implemented is important in its eventual 
success (Kibel, 1982). Future research needs to examine 
the impact of the speed with which actions are taken to 
turn around a firm. 
The two significant variables also suggest an alter-
native means for future research to conceptualize success-
ful turnaround. The two variables, relatedness and 
acquisition experience, can be viewed as a part of a 
knowledge base required to make an acquisition of a 
turnaround candidate. Future research should examine 
other potential areas of a firm's knowledge that could 
impact the success of the turnaround. These knowledge 
areas could include specific technology issues, and an 
understanding of international cultural differences. 
Conclusions 
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Related acquisition of a turnaround candidate results 
in significantly better performance for the acquiring firm 
than does unrelated acquisition. Therefore for the 
practitioner, alluring and apparently underpriced assets 
may not produce the result desired if the acquiring firm 
is unfamiliar with the industry. The ability to under-
stand the needed actions and to implement them quickly are 
central to the success of the turnaround acquisition. 
The findings of this research were based on a conser-
vatively constructed sample. The sample's use of multiple 
measures to identify the turnaround candidates have 
produced one of the cleanest samples of true turnaround 
firms employed in this arena. Future research should 
strive to continue to combine such coarse and fine grained 
measures in identifying turnaround firms. 
The need for future research is significant. By 
continuing research in this area it is hoped that both the 
academic and practitioner communities can achieve a better 
understanding of how to restore health to firms in de-
cline. This knowledge will enable business entities to 
continue in operation and will result in a greater stabil-
ity for the country's economic environment. 
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RATING 
ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Attached is information concerning the results of 53 
mergers and acquisitions. Please rate the success of the 
merger or acquisition as you view it from the complete set 
of comments presented. 
The term "success" is used here to mean that the acquiring 
firm experienced either financial or strategic benefits 
from the acquisition. 
It is recognized that the process of achieving success 
involves trade-offs and unpleasant consequences for some 
stakeholders, such as when employees are laid off to 
improve organizational efficiency. Your judgment about 
the acquisition for the acquiring firm should include your 
judgment about whether these trade-offs contributed to 
financial and strategic benefits to the firm. 
Some of the material presented on specific mergers and 
acquisitions is several pages long. It is very important 
that you read all of the stories since the analysis may 
vary from writer to writer and over time. 
I will retrieve your evaluations from you on Monday, May 
8, 1989. 
Thank you for your help. 
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Circle the number that best describes the outcome for the 
acquiring firm. 
1 = very unsuccessful - the acquiring firm experi-
enced no significant 
financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
2 
3 
= 
= 
unsuccessful 
moderately unsuccessful 
4 = 
5 = 
neutral - cannot determine if the acquiring firm 
experienced financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
moderately successful 
6 = successful 
7 = very successful - the acqu1r1ng firm experienced 
either significant financial 
or strategic benefits from the 
acquisition 
1. A&P acquired Shopwell in 1986 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 • • • . . • . • 4 . . . . • . • . 5 . . . . . . • . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
2. Adobe Oil & Gas merged with Madison Resources to become 
Adobe Resources in 1985 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 • • • • • • • • 4 • • • • • • • • 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
3. Alaska Interstate acquired C&K Petroleum in 1980 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 • • • • • • • • 4 • • • • • • • • 5 • • • • • • • • 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral 
4. Amax acquired Rosario Resources in 1980 
very 
successful 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 • • • • • • • • 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
5. American Healthcare Management acquired Huntington 
Health Services in 1983 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 • • • • • • • • 3 • • • • • • • • 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . • • • • • • • 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
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Circle the number that best describes the outcome for the 
acquiring firm. 
1 = very unsuccessful - the acqu~r~ng firm experi-
enced no significant 
financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
2 
3 
= 
= 
unsuccessful 
moderately unsuccessful 
4 = 
5 = 
neutral - cannot determine if the acqu~r~ng firm 
experienced financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
moderately successful 
6 = successful 
7 = very successful - the acqu~r~ng firm experienced 
either significant financial 
or strategic benefits from the 
acquisition. 
6. Anschutz acquired Rio Grande Industries in 1984 
1 • . • . . . • . 2 . • . . . • . . 3 • • • . . • • . 4 . . . . . • . . 5 . . . • . . . • 6 • . . . . . . • "7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
7. Bacardi acquired Lloyd's Electronics in 1983 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
8. Bond Corporate Holdings acquired Heileman Brewing in 
1987 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral 
9. Borden acquired Guy's Foods in 1979 
very 
successful 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral 
10. Buckhorn acquired New Idria in 1984 
very 
successful 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
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Circle the number that best describes the outcome for the 
acquiring firm. 
1 = very unsuccessful - the acquiring firm experi-
enced no significant 
financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
2 unsuccessful 
3 moderately unsuccessful 
4 neutral - cannot determine if the acquiring firm 
experienced financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
5 = moderately successful 
6 = successful 
7 = very successful - the acquiring firm experienced 
either significant financial 
or strategic benefits from the 
acquisition. 
11. Calmar acquired Realex in 1985 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral 
12. Cavenham USA acquired Weingarten in 1980 
very 
successful 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 • • • • • • • • 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
13. Champion International acquired St. Regis in 1984 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 • • • • • • • • 3 • • • • • • • • 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
14. Chesebrough Ponds acquired Stauffer Chemical in 1985 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 • • • • • • • • 3 • • • • • • • • 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
15. Cooper Industries acquired McGraw Edison in 1985 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
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Circle the number that best describes the outcome for the 
acquiring firm. 
1 = very unsuccessful - the acquiring firm experi-
enced no significant 
financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
2 
3 
= 
= 
unsuccessful 
moderately unsuccessful 
4 
5 
= 
= 
neutral - cannot determine if the acquiring firm 
experienced financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
moderately successful 
6 = successful 
7 = very successful - the acquiring firm experienced 
either significant financial 
or strategic benefits from the 
acquisition. 
16. Dairy Mart acquired Canna Corporation in 1986 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . • . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . • . . . . 5 . . • . . • . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
17. Dome Placer was formed by the merger of Campbell Red 
Lake Mines, Dome Mines and Placer Development in 1987 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . • . . • • . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral 
18. Eastmet acquired UIP Corporation in 1979 
very 
successful 
1 . • • . . . . . 2 . . . . • . . . 3 . . . . . . • . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral 
19. Esquire acquired Allyn & Bacon in 1981 
very 
successful 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . • • . . . 3 . . . . . . • • 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
20. Field Acquisition (part of Schenley Industries) 
acquired Sonoma Vineyards in 1985 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . • • • . . . . 3 . . • • • . . . 4 . . . • . • • • 5 . . . . . • • . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
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Circle the number that best describes the outcome for the 
acquiring firm. 
1 = very unsuccessful - the acquiring firm experi-
enced no significant 
financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
2 
3 
= 
= 
unsuccessful 
moderately unsuccessful 
4 
5 
= 
= 
neutral - cannot determine if the acquiring firm 
experienced financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
moderately successful 
6 = successful 
7 = very successful - the acquiring firm experienced 
either significant financial 
or strategic benefits from the 
acquisition. 
21. Foseco Minsep acquired Gibson-Romans in 1984 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 • . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral 
22. Fred Meyer acquired Grand Central in 1984 
very 
successful 
1 . . . • • . • . 2 . . . • . • . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral 
23. Gulton Industries acquired Altec in 1985 
very 
successful 
1 . • . • • . . . 2 . . . • . . . • 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 • . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
24. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich acquired Florida Cypress 
Gardens in 1985 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . • . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral 
25. Hawley acquired ADT in 1987 
very 
successful 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 • • • • • • • • 4 • • • • • • • • 5 • • • • • • • • 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
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Circle the number that best describes the outcome for the 
acquiring firm. 
1 = very unsuccessful - the acqu1r1ng firm experi-
enced no significant 
financial or strategic 
benefits from the 
acquisition 
2 
3 
= 
= 
unsuccessful 
moderately unsuccessful 
4 
5 
= 
= 
neutral - cannot determine if the acqu1r1ng firm 
experienced financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
moderately successful 
6 = successful 
7 = very successful - the acqu1r1ng firm experienced 
either significant financial 
or strategic benefits from the 
acquisition. 
26. Hecla Mining acquired Ranchers Exploration in 1984 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 • . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
27. Hinderliter acquired Southwest Factories in 1982 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
28. Imperial Group acquired Howard Johnson in 1980 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral 
29. Insilco acquired Dual-Lite in 1987 
very 
successful 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral 
30. Louisiana Land acquired Inexco in 1986 
very 
successful 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
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Circle the number that best describes the outcome for the 
acquiring firm. 
1 = very unsuccessful - the acqu1r1ng firm experi-
enced no significant 
financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
2 
3 
= 
= 
unsuccessful 
moderately unsuccessful 
4 
5 
= 
= 
neutral - cannot determine if the acqu1r1ng firm 
experienced financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
moderately successful 
6 = successful 
7 = very successful - the acquiring firm experienced 
either significant financial 
or strategic benefits from the 
acquisition. 
31. Manor Care acquired Cenco in 1981 
1 ....... . 2 ••••••• • 3 ........ 4 ........ 5 ........ 6 ........ 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
32. Marine Construction and Design acquired Campbell 
Industries in 1979 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral 
33. Masco acquired Brass-Craft in 1982 
very 
successful 
1 . . . . .... 2 ........ 3 ........ 4 . . ....... 5 . . . . .... 6 ........ 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral 
34. Maynard Oil acquired Echo Oil in 1979 
very 
successful 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 • • • • • • • • 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
35. McDonnell-Douglas acquired Tymshare in 1984 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . • • • • • • • 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
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Circle the number that best describes the outcome for the 
acquiring firm. 
1 = very unsuccessful - the acquiring firm experi-
enced no significant 
financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
2 
3 
= 
= 
unsuccessful 
moderately unsuccessful 
4 
5 
= 
= 
neutral - cannot determine if the acqu1r1ng firm 
experienced financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
moderately successful 
6 = successful 
7 = very successful - the acquiring firm experienced 
either significant financial 
or strategic benefits from the 
acquisition. 
36. Miller Cascade acquired Pacific Gamble Robinson in 
1987 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 • • • • • • • • 3 . . . • . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 • • • • • • • • 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
37. National Education Corp. acquired Intext in 1979 
1 .. ..... . 2 ........ 3 ... .... . 4 . .... ... 5 ........ 6 ........ 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
38. Newell acquired Wright (William E.) in 1986 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
39. R.B. Pamplin acquired Riegel Textile in 1985 
1 ........ 2 ........ 3 ........ 4 ........ 5 ........ 6 ........ 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
40. Peoples Express acquired Frontier Airlines in 1985 
1 ........ 2 ........ 3 ... .... . 4 . ...... . 5 ........ 6 ........ 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
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Circle the number that best describes the outcome for the 
acquiring firm. 
1 = very unsuccessful - the acqu1r1ng firm experi-
enced no significant 
financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
2 
3 
= 
= 
unsuccessful 
moderately unsuccessful 
4 
5 
= 
= 
neutral - cannot determine if the acqu1r1ng firm 
experienced financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
moderately successful 
6 = successful 
7 = very successful - the acqu1r1ng firm experienced 
either significant financial 
or strategic benefits from the 
acquisition. 
41. Petrie Stores acquires Miller-Wahl in 1984 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
42. Riordan, Freeman & Spogli acquired Bayless Markets in 
1984 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . • • . . . . • 3 • . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
43. Schottenstein acquired M.H. Fishman in 1979 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 • • • • • • • • 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
44. Seaboard Coast Line merged with Chessie System in 1980 
to become CSX 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 • • • • • • • • 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
45. Sherwin-Williams acquired Gray/Drug Fair in 1981 
1 ........ 2 ........ 3 ........ 4 ....... ~5 ........ 6 ........ 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
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Circle the number that best describes the outcome for the 
acquiring firm. 
1 = very unsuccessful the acqu1r1ng firm experi-
enced no significant 
financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
2 
3 
= 
= 
unsuccessful 
moderately unsuccessful 
4 
5 
= 
= 
neutral - cannot determine if the acqu1r1ng firm 
experienced financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
moderately successful 
6 = successful 
7 = very successful - the acqu1r1ng firm experienced 
either significant financial 
or strategic benefits from the 
acquisition. 
46. Synder General acquired McQuay in 1984 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 • . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
47. Solvay & Cie acquired Purepac Laboratories in 1979 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 • • • • • • • • 4 • • • • • • • • 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
48. Southeastern Public Service acquired Graniteville in 
1984 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . • . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
49. Standard Oil of Indiana (Amoco Corp.) acquired Cyprus 
Mines in 1979 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
50. Sun Chemical (Sequa) acquired Intercontinental Dynamics 
in 1986 
1 . . . . • . . . 2 . . • . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
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Circle the number that best describes the outcome for the 
acquiring firm. 
1 = very unsuccessful - the acquiring firm experi-
enced no significant 
financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
2 = 
3 = 
4 = 
5 
-
6 = 
7 = 
unsuccessful 
moderately unsuccessful 
neutral - cannot determine if the acquiring firm 
experienced financial or strategic 
benefits from the acquisition 
moderately successful 
successful 
very successful - the acquiring firm experienced 
either significant financial 
or strategic benefits from the 
acquisition. 
51. Sundstrand acquired Sullair in 1984 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . 5 . • . . • . • . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
52. Technology for Communications International acquired BR 
Communications in 1987 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 • • • • • • • • 3 • • • • • • • • 4 • • • • • • • • 5 . . . . . . . . 6 • • • • • • • • 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral 
53. Unimar acquired Enstar in 1984 
very 
successful 
1 . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . • • . . 5 . . • • . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . 7 
very 
unsuccessful 
neutral very 
successful 
APPENDIX B 
FIRMS REMOVED FROM 
POTENTIAL SAMPLE 
No Information On Merger Partner (9) 
• Barth Spencer 
• Dixico 
• Federal Resources 
• Kratos 
• Vernitron 
Banks (2) 
• Land Resources 
e MWA 
• Pratt-Read 
e SPW 
• Crocker Bank • Ban Cal Tri-State Corporations 
Controlled by Acquiring Firm (7) 
• Standard Oil Company was acquired by British 
Petroleum. BP controlled Standard Oil by 1970. 
• Docutel Olivetti was acquired in 1984 by Olivetti 
Corp. By 1981 Olivetti owned 17% of firm. 
Historically Docutel Olivetti appears to be tight-
ly controlled by Olivetti. 
• IMC Magnetics was acquired in 1984 by Nihom 
Miniature Bearings, which had gained control by 
1975. 
• Altamil was acquired in 1984 by Great Lakes Corp. 
Pritzker family controlled both firms; by 1980 
they controlled Altamil. 
• Fanny Farmer was acquired in 1980 by Amoskeag. 
In 1977 Amoskeag already controlled 41% of firm's 
stock. 
• Brinks was acquired in 1979 by Pittson. In 1962 
Pittson acquired control of Brinks. 
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• Equitable Life Mortgage and Realty was established 
in 1970. It was acquired by Equitable Life 
Assurance Society in 1982. Equitable Life 
Assurance Society appears to assert considerable 
control throughout the acquired firm's life. 
LEO's, ESOP's, Private Acquisitions (14) 
• Almay Stores • Hamilton Brothers Exploration 
• Beeline Inc. • Kaiser Cement 
• Blue Bell • McLean Trucking 
• Brooks Fashions • MPO Videotronics 
• CCI Corporation • Niagra Frontier 
• Cone Mills • Peerless Chain 
• Fey Industries • Tri-Caro 
Industry in Decline but firm performing well by qualita-
tive measure (2) 
• Masonite • Superior Oil 
Industry in decline by quantitative measure (3) 
• California Portland Cement • Cascade Steel 
• Patton Oil 
Stories did not support firm as a turnaround candidate (5) 
• Buffalo Forge • Getty Oil 
• Eltra Corporation • Monfort of Colorado 
• Woods Petroleum 
APPENDIX C 
VARIANCES IN ACQUISITION DATES 
There were three instances where the popular press 
and Mergers & Acquisitions were in conflict on the date 
of merger. These were: 
1. Brass Craft - Mergers & Acquisitions (1983) 
cites a 3/19/83 merger date. However, the 
Merrill Lynch analysis of Masco already 
discusses Brass Craft as if it had been acquired 
by 12/30/82. This analysis is one of the major 
sources of information on this acquisition; the 
research presented here used a 1982 acquisition 
date. 
2. Heileman Brewing - Mergers & Acquisitions (1988) 
discusses 3/19/88 as when the firm was taken 
private by Bond Corporate Holdings. However, 
by October, 1987 Bond already owned 91% of 
Heileman's stock. 
Business Week, 11/7/88 discussed the Heileman 
acquisition in terms of it occurring in 1987 
(Oneal, 1988). Therefore, 1987 was used as the 
acquisition date. 
3. Gibson-Romans -Mergers & Acquisitions (1985) 
cites a 1/2/85 merger date, but the Wall Street 
Journal notes that by 12/31/84 the merger was 
already approved by both parties. The study 
used the 1984 date. 
One unusual acquisition was also included in the sample. 
4. Drug Fair was acquired by Gray Drug in May, 
1981. Sherwin-Williams purchased both Drug 
Fair and Gray Drug by September, 1981. Due to 
the short time held by Gray Drug, the study 
included Drug Fair in the sample considering 
Sherwin Williams as its purchaser. 
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APPENDIX D 
INDUSTRY DECLINING - FIRM 
PERFORMANCE POOR 
Howard Johnson was acquired in 1980. The firm had some 
very severe criticisms written about its performance. The 
comments on the firm included: 
New York Times, (1980) 
Value Line, the investment survey, in a report it 
published only 10 days ago, said it had trimmed its 
1980 estimate of Howard Johnson earnings to $1.35 a 
share, or 13 percent less than in 1979. 
Journal of Commerce, (1980) 
The deterioration in Howard Johnson's trading 
prospects also has caused Imperial Group to rethink 
its strategy, analysts say. 
Graniteville was acquired in 1984. One of its principal 
industries was in decline while the other was not. 
However, Wheat First Securities analyzed Graniteville to 
be in the lower half of comparable textile firms when 
analyzing their net margin (1982) or earnings per share 
1981-1983 (Pickler, 1982). 
Weingarten was acquired in 1980. It also has specific 
industry comparisons of its low industry performance. 
Supermarket News shows net profit as a percent of 
sales for the supermarket industry to be 0.87 in 
both 1977 and 1978 (Moore, 1979). Weingarten had a 
net profit as a percent of sales in 1977 of 0.4 and 
experienced a loss in 1978. 
Lloyd's was acquired in 1983. 
scribed in written stories as 
1986) and it was experiencing 
the time of its acquisition. 
The firm itself is de-
a "marginal" firm (Behar, 
a high level of losses at 
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APPENDIX E 
INDUSTRY DECLINING - FIRM 
PERFORMANCE GOOD 
Masonite Corporation was acquired in 1984. 
Wall (1984) 
Although Masonite had a $6.1 million loss in fiscal 
1982, it has become increasingly attractive as an 
acquisition target. Recovering with the housing 
industry. 
Business Week (1984) 
Masonite is back on its feet after a disastrous 
two-year housing slump that socked the company with 
a $6 million loss in the year ended Aug. 31, 1982. 
Superior Oil was acquired in 1984. 
Beginning in 1982 the oil industry went into a 
decline. However, even during the period of decline 
Superior was described in terms such as the 
following: 
New York Times (1983) 
After William M. Keck died in 1964, the leadership 
of a small company he founded - Superior Oil - fell 
to his son, Howard B. Keck, who built it into a 
premier independent explorer and producer. 
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APPENDIX F 
HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS INDICATING 
NON-TURNAROUND CANDIDATES 
Monfort of Colorado Inc. was acquired in 1987. By 1986 it 
appears to be turned around already. 
Ivey (1986) 
While many in the beef industry are suffering, the 
price of Monfort stock has soared from $17 per share 
to $48 in a year. 
Six years ago, Monfort of Colorado Co. was almost 
out of business. But Monfort fought back with a 
series of cost cutting measures and shrewd marketing 
that brought the company back to life. Now he's 
trying to do it again. 
Getty Oil was acquired in 1984. 
Value Line (1983a) 
The company is rated tops for financial strength, 
and the shares ought to perform as well as most 
others in next 12 months. 
Rating of company financial strength A++. 
Woods Petroleum was acquired in 1985. 
Wall Street Transcript (1984) 
analysis by Rauscher, Pierce, Refnes Inc. 
Woods appears to be in excellent financial condi-
tion, superb compared to most exploration and 
production companies. 
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Eltra Corporation was acquired in 1979. 
Business Week (1978) 
Eltra's financial fortunes have advanced steadily. 
Moreover, the sales-to-employee ratio has nearly 
doubled over the five year period. 
Anreder (1978) 
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Brightening the outlook is a r1.s1.ng tide of incoming 
orders, now running some 5%-10% above year ago 
levels. 
Value Line (1978) 
Rating of company financial strength A+. 
Buffalo Forge was acquired in 1981. 
In an effort to be conservative Buffalo Forge was 
eliminated from the sample. This firm had extensive 
stories written on acquisition attempts of the firm 
and its eventual acquisition by Ampco-Pittsburgh. 
However, none of these stories described Buffalo 
Forge in terms which would indicate it is a 
turnaround candidate. Rather, terms indicated that 
Buffalo Forge had average performance. For example: 
Wall Street Journal (1981) 
The bidding match for Buffalo Forge, usually a quiet 
performer on the market, has pushed up its stock 
price. 
APPENDIX G 
FINAL SAMPLE 
1. A&P acquired Shopwell in 1986. 
2. Adobe Oil & Gas merged with Madison Resources to 
become Adobe Resources in 1985. 
3. Alaska Interstate acquired C&K Petroleum in 1980. 
4. American Healthcare Management acquired Huntington 
Health Services in 1983. 
5. Anschutz acquired Rio Grande Industries in 1984. 
6. Bacardi acquired Lloyd's Electronics in 1983. 
7. Bond Corporate Holdings acquired Heileman Brewing in 
1987. 
8. Borden acquired Guy's Foods in 1979. 
9. Buckhorn acquired New Idria in 1984. 
10. Calmar acquired Realex in 1985. 
11. cavenham USA acquired Weingarten in 1980. 
12. Champion International acquired St. Regis in 1984. 
13. Chesebrough Ponds acquired Stauffer Chemical in 
1985. 
14. Cooper Industries acquired McGraw Edison in 1985. 
15. Dairy Mart acquired Conna Corporation in 1986. 
16. Dome Placer was formed by the merger of Campbell Red 
Lake Mines, Dome Mines and Placer Development in 
1987. 
17. Eastmet acquired UIP Corporation in 1979. 
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18. Esquire acquired Allyn & Bacon in 1981. 
19. Field Acquisition (part of Schenley Industries) 
acquired Sonoma Vineyards in 1985. 
20. Foseco Minsep acquired Gibson-Homans in 1984. 
21. Fred Meyer acquired Grand Central in 1984. 
22. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich acquired Florida Cypress 
Gardens in 1985. 
23. Hawley acquired ADT in 1987. 
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24. Hecla Mining acquired Ranchers Exploration in 1984. 
25. Hinderliter acquired Southwest Factories in 1982. 
26. Imperial Group acquired Howard Johnson in 1980. 
27. Insilco acquired Dual-Lite in 1987. 
28. Louisiana Land acquired Inexco in 1986. 
29. Manor Care acquired Cenco in 1981. 
30. Marine Construction and Design acquired Campbell 
Industries in 1979. 
31. Masco acquired Brass-Craft in 1982. 
32. Maynard Oil acquired Echo Oil in 1979. 
33. McDonnell-Douglas acquired Tymshare in 1984. 
34. Miller Cascade acquired Pacific Gamble Robinson in 
1987. 
35. National Education Corp. acquired Intext in 1979. 
36. Newell acquired Wright (William E.) in 1986. 
37. R.B. Pamplin acquired Riegel Textile in 1985. 
38. Peoples Express acquired Frontier Airlines in 1985. 
39. Petrie Stores acquired Miller-Wahl in 1984. 
40. Riordan, Freeman & Spogli acquired Bayless Markets 
in 1984. 
41. Schottenstein acquired M.H. Fishman in 1979. 
42. Seaboard Coast Line merged with Chessie System in 
1980 to become CSX. 
43. Sherwin-Williams acquired Gray/Drug Fair in 1981. 
44. Snyder General acquired McQuay in 1984. 
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45. Solvay & Cie acquired Purepac Laboratories in 1979. 
46. Southeastern Public Service acquired Graniteville in 
1984 0 . 
47. Standard Oil of Indiana (Amoco Corp.) acquired 
Cyprus Mines in 1979. 
48. Sun Chemical (Sequa) acquired Intercontinental 
Dynamics in 1986. 
49. Sundstrand acquired Sullair in 1984. 
50. Technology for Communications International acquired 
BR Communications in 1987. 
51. Unimar acquired Enstar in 1984. 
APPENDIX H 
REGRESSION VARIABLES 
AND VALUES 
NAME PERFORMANCE EXPERIENCE DECLINE SIZE RELATED* 
A&P 6.67 2 86.6 0.07 1 ADOBE 5.67 0 2.6 3.39 1 ALASKA INTER 5.67 3 54.1 0.07 1 AM HEALTH 5.33 0 47.0 0.65 1 ANSCHUTZ 1. 33 0 28.7 0.35 0 BACARDI 1. 33 1 
- 125.6 0.30 0 BOND CORP 1. 67 1 24.0 0.90 0 BORDEN 5.67 2 42.2 0.01 0 BUCKHORN 4.00 0 1.9 1. 78 0 CALMAR 6.00 1 51.6 0.40 1 CAVENHAM 1. 67 2 
- 179.1 0.10 0 CHAMPION 4.67 0 73.5 0.64 1 CHESEBROUGH 1. 00 4 - 108.2 0.81 0 COOPER 5.67 3 62.1 0.85 1 DAIRY MART 6.33 0 
-2918.1 0.73 1 DOME PLACER 5.33 1 38.9 0.20 1 EASTMET 2.33 0 24.4 0.26 0 ESQUIRE 6.67 4 70.8 0.29 1 FIELD ACQUIS 6.33 0 - 385.0 0.09 1 FOSECO MINSEP 1. 67 0 0.8 0.09 0 FRED MEYER 5.67 0 - 273.4 0.20 1 HARCOURT 6.00 2 25.3 0.02 0 HAWLEY 6.33 2 - 219.0 0.94 0 HECLA 5.67 1 36.0 0.60 1 HINDERLITER 6.33 0 74.0 0.55 1 IMPERIAL 1. 33 1 16.9 0.08 0 INSILCO 6.33 3 8.0 0.05 0 LOUISIANA 5.00 1 
- 202.2 0.15 1 MANOR CARE 5.67 1 7.1 0.40 1 MARINE CON 3.33 0 - 342.2 1. 82 1 MAS CO 6.00 8 24.8 0.08 0 
MAYNARD 4.67 0 24.7 0.20 1 MACDONNELL 3.00 6 53.0 0.04 0 MILLER-CASCADE 5.33 0 69.7 4.60 1 NATL ED 5.33 1 19.5 1.19 1 NEWELL 5.67 2 53.3 0.18 0 
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PAMPLIN 5.00 1 52.4 3.73 1 
PEOPLE•s 1. 00 0 - 281.4 1.15 1 
PETRIE 6.33 5 14.8 0.38 1 
RIORDAN 1. 00 0 41.9 11.82 0 
SCHOTTENSTEIN 4.67 0 86.8 0.43 1 
SEABOARD 6.67 1 30.9 1.17 1 
SHERWIN-WILLIAMS 1. 33 0 36.9 0.21 0 
SNYDER 5.67 1 - 137.6 0.85 1 
SOLVAY 4.67 1 23.4 0.01 0 
SOUTHEASTERN 4.00 0 - 227.5 1. 43 0 
STD OIL 1.00 2 83.8 0.02 0 
SUN CHEM 5.67 3 - 225.6 0.02 0 
SUNDSTRAND 4.67 6 - 257.2 0.13 1 
TECH COMM 6.67 0 74.6 0.25 1 
UN I MAR 5.00 0 45.4 0.03 1 
*(1= RELATED; 2=UNRELATED) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Performance 4.51 1. 92 1.0 6.67 
Size -144.34 407.26 -2918.15 16.91 
Decline 0.88 1. 83 0.01 11.82 
Experience 1. 41 1. 84 0.00 8.0 
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